

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND CONVENTIONAL WARFARE:
ACCOUNTING FOR CHANGES IN MILITARY DOCTRINE

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate School of
Binghamton University
State University of New York
2012

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2012

April 20, 2012

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Abstract

Whether or not there was an observable pattern or other evidence that might reveal the possibility of a change in doctrine during the period in which the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were conducted was the first thing that was investigated. A comparison of how the military budget allocations were made between counterinsurgency (COIN) and conventional warfare during the period from 2001 to 2009 revealed that there was a significant shift in allocations made in favor of irregular warfare. To support this initial finding, a pilot test, which observed changes in the percentage of the U.S. military budget allocated to COIN was performed, and it found that they had significantly increased, while the military expenditures for continuing the traditional funding for military business had declined in a statistically significant way. This introduces the possibility that the traditionally conservative U.S. military can elect to change its way of fighting.

Another finding, which resulted from a review of the literature regarding the debate between conventional warfare and COIN is that the philosophical origin of COIN warfare emerged from Sun Tzu's theory of preservation. The key tenet of the COIN doctrine employs a population centric approach, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people by offering them security and a social infrastructure. The COIN doctrine prioritizes the importance of the security of the civilian population for the expressed purpose of preventing the unexpected death of civilians because when civilian deaths occur military operations are significantly damaged. Securing the way of life for ordinary people is a prerequisite for the success of a COIN military operation. The most important engagement is not direct contact with armed dissidents but with the people who are the "water" for the "fish" of insurgents. Building up a friendly environment is more important than displaying the military's capability to kill people.

The approach employed in the execution of the COIN doctrine has a lot of similarities with what Sun Tzu suggested a long time ago in *The Art of War*, which states that winning a war without fighting is the best strategy in warfare, since it preserves the army, people, and allies.¹ Sun Tzu explicitly mentioned in a chapter entitled "Planning Offensive" (謀攻) that "[A]ttaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence," "Preserving the enemy's state is best, and destroying their state capital second-best. "Preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best ..., destroying their squads second-best."² Both COIN and Sun-Tzu's preservation theory share the same common in indirect approach for achieving victory in war by creating the conditions under which victory can be assured.

This dissertation focuses on the examination of one key factor that can influence the choice of a military doctrine, and that is that the assimilation process that takes place when military officers are exposed to a civilian education. Such an education can lead to a change in military doctrine that will be less conventionally oriented. The logic of this argument is not complicated. I accept that the military is a much more conservative organization than what is normally found in a civilian society. The traditional choice of doctrine in the conservative military has been a conventional

¹ Ralph D. Sawyer, *SUN TZU: Art of War* (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 1994).

² *Ibid.*, 177.

strategy that focuses on a potential state challenger. This is the way that the U.S. had always prepared for and fought its enemies until the introduction of the COIN doctrine around 2006.

In order for the military to become less conservative, there has to be an external influence. I suggest that influence is a civilian education. For those in the higher levels of military leadership (generals and colonels), who have had the experience of studying at a civilian educational institution, their opinion on matters related to military doctrine has a tendency to be less conventional, and therefore they are more willing to embrace counterinsurgency. The exposure to a liberal society in an institution of higher learning, while being separated from the tightly regulated life of the military tends to make an officer more flexible and willing to seek out and accept alternative doctrines.

In support of this thesis, a statistical analysis is introduced that focuses on how the combined effect of obtaining a degree from a civilian institution of learning, and the involvement in an ongoing war has implications with regard to doctrinal choice. As for each individual factor, both a civilian education and an ongoing war have a negative impact on the degree of conservatism in the military. However, the interactive effect of these two variables, namely, the conditional effect of a civilian education on the existence of an ongoing war, turned out to have a positive association with conservatism in the military. This is a reasonable outcome considering that during any kind of war, the effect of a civilian education on the military leadership is less likely to have an effect on existing doctrine.

However, there is expected to be a small change right after the war is over, when the proportion of the military leadership with a civilian education is high, because the military leadership will be more flexible which should allow the COIN doctrine to prevail as the level of civilian education increases. This is a partial answer to the question of why there was no doctrinal change after the Vietnam War. Based on what I found in the statistical model in Chapter VI, in the middle of the 1970s, the level of the military leadership with a civilian education was very low, so the U.S. military reverted to a high degree of conservatism following the Vietnam War. However, this should not occur again after the conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, since a sudden return to a conservative military is not expected in the near future given the existing military leadership, which includes a majority of generals (greater than sixty percent) who have experienced a civilian education.

DEDICATION

To my family (Jinhwa, Jin, and Joonhwan), my mother and parents-in-law for their endless love and encouragement.

This dissertation is especially dedicated to my beloved country, the Republic of Korea, its Armed Forces, and my late father who fought in the Korean War.

Acknowledgements

Finishing this dissertation project was a transpacific voyage and a long journey of discovery. Five years have passed since I flew from Seoul to this small city of Binghamton, NY, which is isolated from the larger cities in the state and proved to be a perfect place to study. This outcome would not have been possible without help from committee members, faculty, colleagues, and many friends.

First and foremost, my deep gratitude should go to all my committee members. For Professor Ricardo Rene Laremont, I cannot find the proper words to describe how thankful I am for what you have done for me and my family. You are a wonderful academic advisor and mentor, who has taught me not only how to do research but also how to improve my life. It was my good fortune to have you as my committee chair. It was an invaluable experience to have worked with you as your research assistant. Professor David Cingranelli, you are a great advisor. I was very lucky to work with you and have the benefit of your advice to help me overcome every obstacle I faced. It was my honor to have you on my committee. Your guidance was timely, accurate, and valuable. Professor Olga Shvetsova, you were always within reach whenever I needed you and you reached me whenever you thought I needed you. I cannot thank you enough for your timely help. You have always been supportive and I really appreciated it.

At the same time, I want to express my appreciation to all the faculty members and administrators in my department, including Sandra T. Glemby, who helped me a lot and showed sympathy to me when I was in deep trouble. I would like to thank my colleagues, who helped me adapt to a new American life through scholarly debate and social activities. Especially, I am really grateful to Nikolay A. Merkulov, who is my best friend, and is regarded as one of my family members. Your insightful ideas, bright recommendations, and magical ability to organize concepts were pricelessly helpful to me. I will remember the fierce discussions that we had at the Appalachian Dining Observatory.

As a Korean, I am also very grateful for the help that I received from a number of Korean scholars at Binghamton University, namely, Professor Sungdai Cho, Seungbae Park, and Yoon-Kyung Lee, who collectively gave a lot of support and encouragement to me. A special thank needs to go to Professor Cho who was willing to be an outside examiner and suggested insightful ideas for future research. I also want to express my gratitude to Chaeho Shin, Pastor (and Professor) KeeSoo Choi and Master Joongshik Choi who showed me what real leadership was all about. As a military officer of the Republic of Korea Army, I could not have had this honorable opportunity to study in the United States without the support from my institution and constituents, especially, Professor Young-ho Kim and Hyunkeun Yoon who were my mentors at the Korea National Defense University. Kil-Joo Ban, Sungwoo Kim, and Chihoon Noh are very special for me. Although you were commissioned to be officers later than me, your enthusiasm and passion has been something that inspires me. I think it is also important to acknowledge the help from Hong-Cheol Lee, Se-il Baek, Seung-Ryung Baek, Ho-yong Lee, and Jinwoo Kim in the Korea Armed forces, who studied together with me at Binghamton University, for your camaraderie and friendship. To LTC(R) Larry Sadd, I really appreciate your help that you gave me when I prepared to come to the U.S. and at the early stage of my studies. Larry, without your encouragement I cannot come to this stage. My most profound gratitude goes to Gen(R) Sung-School Lee, who supported me both in my military and scholarly

life. I will always keep in mind the spirit of the military officer that you embody. I could not be here without your help.

As a foreigner in the U.S., I have been fortunate to meet several civilian friends. Debbie and Richard Matsushima, your unconditional love toward Jinhwa, me and my kids made us feel that we were living with a close relative in the U.S. For Lisa Yoon, you and your kids' warm hearted friendship with Jinhwa and my kids helped me concentrate on my work. Without the moment when Jinhwa met you at JCC, I could not reach this point. Also, this work could not have been completed without the help of special friends, Sheila and Bruce Eldred, Paul Brazill, and Julie and Brent Larson, who gave me or my wife English lessons, which together with their friendship have been the seeds for living and studying in the U.S. I will keep your friendship and help in my heart. Especially for Paul, your corrections to my rough drafts of this dissertation and preparation of the presentation were invaluable and beyond description.

Most of all, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my wife, Jinhwa Hong. Without your encouragement and sacrifice I could not have completed this long process. I would give all the credit for this degree to you if I could. My children, Jin and Joonhwan, are the major source of my energy and give special meaning to my life. Please remember that I will live for you forever but I hope you do not live for me, but for yourselves and for your kids in the future as I do. I love you so much.

Lastly, I devoted this work to my late father, Young-Hong Yoo, who inspired me to live in an honorable way, and showed me the true model of a father and teacher as your legacy. I hope to be the father to my kids that you were to me.

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Chapter I

Introduction

Asymmetric Warfare, Military Doctrine, and Victory in War

“War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out the same by other means.”
On War by Carl Von Clausewitz

Research Questions

Why does the U.S. military have difficulty prosecuting wars against smaller insurgent enemies? Given the U.S.’s costly experience in the Vietnam War where it fought against an unconventional enemy, the U.S. should have fared better in the Iraqi and Afghanistan wars. This leads to several questions: What inhibits the U.S. from adapting to a new way of fighting against an irregular enemy, (i.e. shifting to counterinsurgency (COIN) as a military tactic)? How have U.S. military leaders evolved over time? What factors influence change in military doctrine?

I will first address the initial question of why the strongest military actor in the world has difficulty in winning wars against smaller contenders. More often than not, strong actors rely on conventional strategies and tactics that are not suitable for

fighting against smaller opponents, who employ unconventional strategies.¹ The strategic interaction between contending sides is the best predictor of the result of such asymmetric conflicts.² Based on Arreguin-Toft's argument, the probability of the weaker side winning increases when the stronger side implements a strategy that is different from that of the weaker side, since "opposite-approach interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) imply victory for weak actors because the stronger actor's power advantage is deflected or dodged."³

If we accept the proposition that if the U.S. military could obtain victory by adapting to unconventional warfare, what would prevent it from developing COIN as a doctrine? Perhaps this can be explained because the military is considered to be an institutionally conservative organization that is resistant to change.⁴ The U.S. military has historically prepared and fought conventional wars against state challengers and views irregular wars as anomalies not requiring much attention. Consequently, COIN has not been regularly studied and intermittently applied.

However, is there any chance that the military will attempt to change its military doctrine? As Janowitz argued several decades ago, the military has changed as society has changed.⁵ Though it is accepted that military organizations are conservative, and resistant to change, it can be conceded that changes in civilian society eventually influence how the military will operate in the future. It is, therefore,

¹ For more detailed explanations, see Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no.1 (2001): 93-128, and Derek J. Clark and Kai A. Konrad, "Asymmetric Conflict: Weakest Link against Best Shot," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (2007): 457-469.

² Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," 108.

³ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

⁵ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

reasonable to assume that both society and the military have the potential to change. To consider the possibility of a change in military doctrine, the first thing to do is to find some patterns and evidence with which we can observe such a change. Unlike what transpired in the Vietnam War, it has been widely reported that the COIN doctrine is becoming the dominant trend in the U.S. military since the success of the “2007 surge” in the Iraqi campaign. Gian Gentile, a history professor at West Point, mentions that “Counterinsurgency has defined a new American Way of War. More than that, the doctrine of counterinsurgency has become the language and grammar of the current American war in Afghanistan.”⁶ If this statement correctly represents reality, there must have been overt factors that influenced the change in military doctrine from conventional to counterinsurgency.

Before attempting to find the factors influencing such changes, understanding the differences between conventional warfare and COIN is worth investigating for the purpose of comprehending both alternatives. Understanding these differences will help us answer questions about what kind of strategy the U.S. military employs for irregular warfare in terms of philosophical origins, perspectives of warfare, and resources needed for implementing a chosen doctrine.

The debate between conventional warfare and COIN will offer a scholarly basis for developing a theory related to how military doctrine changes. To explore factors that influence the choice of doctrine will be the final outcome of this project. Uncovering the factors that hinder or facilitate the flexibility of the U.S. military will be helpful to answer the main question of why the strongest state tends to lose wars against weaker and smaller enemies.

⁶ Gian P. Gentile, “The Death of American Strategy,” *Infinity Journal* no. 3 (Summer, 2011): 14.

Asymmetric Warfare

Since the literature of asymmetric warfare is related to the main question that I raised above, it is important to analyze it in order to build a theoretical argument that explains why a change in military doctrine happens. The literature related to asymmetric warfare runs a broad spectrum ranging from a strategic approach to an institutional approach. For the sake of understanding this topic, I divided it into three categories, namely, strategy focused, resolve based, and the institutional (cultural) approach.

Scholars focusing on the strategy that each contender chooses argue that smaller armies using unconventional tactics can sometimes defeat larger armies that use conventional warfare strategies.⁷ This approach was epitomized by Kissinger's statement that "[w]e sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win."⁸ Since the Viet Cong used guerrilla tactics while the U.S. implemented an attrition strategy, the mismatch of strategies on each side ended with a victory by the weaker side.

Based on this line of reasoning, the outcome is determined by the interactions of the different strategies. Strong actors are more likely to win same-approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions. Arreguin-Toft suggests that

⁷ For through understanding this argument, see John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 2005), David H. Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars* (Washington D.C.: George Washington University Press, 2009) in addition to Arreguin-Toft and Clark and Konrad's articles mentioned above.

⁸ Henry A. Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs* 47 no.2 (January, 1969): 214.

statistical evidence shows that strong actors won seventy-six percent of all same-approach interactions, while weak actors won sixty-three percent of all opposite-approach interactions. This evidence offers at least two important implications for the U.S.: (1) that it is necessary to adapt to an unconventional warfare strategy⁹ and; (2) a balance is required between conventional warfare and COIN (unconventional warfare) in order to avoid the situation illustrated in the bottom-left hand side of the table below, in which the challenger with a conventional strategy takes advantage over the stronger actor with an unconventional strategy. The U.S. as the strongest military state in the world desperately needs to adopt counterinsurgency, but not use it exclusively or excessively.

SA \ WA	Conventional Strategy	Unconventional Strategy
Conventional Strategy	Strong Actor (SA)	Weak Actor (WA)
Unconventional Strategy	Weak Actor (WA)	Strong Actor (SA)

<Table 1.1: Interactions of Strategies between Contenders >¹⁰

The second line of approach emphasizes the willingness and the resolve to fight against the enemy. Among those who support this point of view, Andrew Mack provides one of the more convincing explanations. He claims that a strong actor, whose military capability is comparatively larger than a smaller actor, may be less resolved to win a war against a smaller actor because defeat in a small war will not affect the large actors' possibility of survival.¹¹ On the other hand, a smaller actor will

⁹ Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War* (Stanford: The Stanford University Press, 2008).

¹⁰ Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," 107.

¹¹ Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric

desperately fight for its survival against the stronger opponent because a loss in such a war means its destruction. Roger Bennett introduces a very insightful assertion that the weaker actor attacks the more vulnerable side of a stronger opponent whereas the stronger side cannot respond with a high degree of resolve.¹² The willingness to fight sometimes overcomes the disadvantage of military capabilities in asymmetric warfare.

Lastly, the third group of scholars focuses on the institutional effect of the consequences in conflict between disproportional competitors. Political institutions impact the effectiveness of military operations depending upon whether the military is under civilian or non-civilian control. This approach has been supported by Deborah Avant. She argues that military institutions under the control of presidential systems are less responsive to changing circumstances compared with other governmental types.¹³

However, when power is delegated from civilians to the military, an agency problem occurs¹⁴ because military officers are in charge of the provision of this public good. The preferences regarding institutional change vary between the military establishment and its overseeing civilians because the two parties are motivated by different incentives and rewards. Military officers focus on building large armies engaged in conventional warfare because this kind of warfare is familiar and, arguably,

Conflict,” *World Politics* 27 no.2 (1975): 175-200.

¹² Roger W. Bennett, *Asymmetric Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power (Issues in Twenty-First Century Warfare)* (Dulles: Brassey’s INC., 2003).

¹³ Deborah Avant, “Institutions and Military Effectiveness,” in *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, edited by Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Standley-Mitchell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

¹⁴ As for delegation and agency loss problem, see Gary W. Cox and Mathew Daniel McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Roderick Kiewiet D. and Mathew Daniel McCubbins, *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek, *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997).

less risky for them. This leads the military to resist change.

The civilian leadership is not only a principal ally of the military leadership but also an agent of its constituents. In order to be elected or reelected, politicians should enact the preferences of their constituencies. In terms of doctrinal choice, the domestic coalition for either a conventional warfare or COIN plays an important role. For example, a domestic coalition that will determine the choice of doctrine can be directly associated with party affiliation. Based on research by Benjamin Fordham, Democratic Presidents tend to support regular forces, while Republican Presidents have a tendency to support the formation of strategic forces emphasizing the use of strategic weapon systems.¹⁵ This internal influence affected by international circumstances will often give a clue to the ultimate doctrine chosen.

The approaches mentioned above do not explain why a strong actor such as the U.S. does not adapt an appropriate strategy, with which it can deal with a smaller actor that is equipped with a high resolve or employs unconventional tactics. What is missing in current literature is the role played by the military leadership, even though it is their responsibility to implement doctrine. In order to cope with these new demands, a state may need to change its military doctrine and organizations. It is understandable that the civilian leadership sometimes intervenes and issues an order to institute changes in the conservative military and that institutions also influence the degree of adaptation required to adjust to new circumstances. However, any argument for change that does not include input from the military leadership is incomplete.

Overall Summary

¹⁵ Benjamin O, Fordham, "Domestic Politics, "International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Spending," *The Journal of Politics* 64 no.1 (2002): 63-88.

Broadly speaking there are two findings that emerge from preliminary research and a review of the literature, and two main arguments based on a theory that focuses on the role of military leadership regarding a change in military doctrine.

Findings

The first thing to investigate was whether or not there was an observable pattern or evidence that might reveal the possibility of a doctrinal change during the period of time that the wars were conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. A comparison of the military budget allocations between COIN and conventional warfare during the period from 2001 to 2009 revealed that there was a significant shift toward irregular warfare. As a first finding, a pilot test observed changes in the percentage of the U.S. military budget allocated to COIN and found that it had significantly increased, while the military expenditures for continuing the traditional funding for military business had declined in a statistically significant way. This offers the possibility that the conservative U.S. military can change its way of fighting.

Another finding resulting from a review of the literature regarding the debate between conventional warfare and COIN was that the philosophical origin of COIN warfare emerges from Sun Tzu's theory of preservation. The key tenet of the COIN doctrine involves a population centric approach, which is aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people by offering them security and a social infrastructure. The COIN doctrine prioritizes the security of the civilian for the purpose of preventing the unexpected death of civilians, because when civilian deaths occur military operations are significantly compromised. Securing the way of life for ordinary people is a prerequisite for the success of a COIN military operation. The most important engagement is not a direct contact with armed dissidents but through the people who

are the “water” for the “fish” of insurgents. Building up a friendly environment is more important than displaying the military capabilities of killing people.

This approach has a lot of similarities with what Sun Tzu suggested a long time ago in *The Art of War*, saying that winning a war without fighting is the best strategy in warfare through preserving army, people, and allies.¹⁶ Sun Tzu explicitly mentioned in a “Planning Offensive” (謀攻) Chapter that “[A]ttaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence”. “Preserving the enemy’s state is best, destroying their state capital second-best”. “Preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best ..., destroying their squads second-best.”¹⁷ Both COIN and Sun-Tzu’s preservation theory share the same common indirect approach to achieve victory in war by creating conditions under which the victory can be assured.

Arguments

The main argument in this dissertation focuses on one factor that can influence the choice of a military doctrine and that is that the assimilation process that is achieved by educating military officers within civilian educational institutions, which reduces institutional conservatism in the military and leads to a military doctrine that will be less conventionally oriented. The logic of this argument is not complicated. I accept that the military is a much more conservative organization when compared with civilian society. The traditional choice of doctrine in the conservative military has been a conventional strategy that focuses on a potential state challenger. This is

¹⁶ Ralph D. Sawyer, *SUN TZU: Art of War* (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 1994).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 177.

the way that the U.S. had always prepared for and fought until the introduction of the COIN doctrine around 2006.

In order for the military to be less conservative, there has to be an external influence that causes it to become less conservative. I suggest that that influence is a civilian education offered to military officers. Interaction with a civilian society that is less conservative than the military is assumed to have an effect on the degree of conservatism in military. For the higher levels of the military leadership (generals and colonels), who have had the experience of studying at a civilian educational institution, their choice of military doctrine has a tendency to be less conventional, and therefore more willing to embrace counterinsurgency. The exposure to a liberal society in higher institutions of learning, and being separated from the tightly regulated life of the military makes an officer more flexible and willing to seek out and accept alternative doctrines.

To support this thesis a statistical analysis is constructed that measures whether the combined effects of obtaining a degree from a civilian institution of learning, and the involvement in an ongoing war has some implications with regard to doctrinal choice. As for each individual factor, both the civilian education, and the ongoing war have a negative impact on the degree of conservatism in the military. However, the interactive effect of these two variables, namely the conditional effect of a civilian education on the existence of an ongoing war, turned out to have a positive association with conservatism in the military. This is a reasonable outcome considering that during the time a war is conducted, the effect of a civilian education on the military leadership is less likely to have an effect on existing doctrine.

However, there is expected to be a small change that begins during the period following the end of the war as the proportion of the military leadership with a

civilian education increases. The increase in flexibility of the military leadership resulting from more exposure to a civilian education should allow the COIN doctrine to prevail. This is a partial answer to the question of why there was no doctrinal change immediately following the Vietnam War. Based on what I found in the statistical model in Chapter VI, in the middle of the 1970s, the level of the military leadership with a civilian education was very low so that the U.S. military reverted to a high degree of conservatism right after the Vietnam War. However, it should not occur again after the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have ended, since the majority of generals (greater than sixty percent) have an experienced civilian education.

Outline

Since this project is composed of four distinct but related questions, the dissertation has been constructed to address each question.

Chapters I: Introduction

The motivation for this project and research questions are presented along with a review of the literature focused on asymmetrical warfare, and a summary of findings and arguments. In addition, the first question that addressed the reason why the U.S. military was reluctant to adapt to a new doctrine is answered.

Chapter II: Patterns and Evidence Obtained from the Military Budget

This chapter will address whether or not there was any attempt by the U.S. military to adjust to changing circumstances. This question must be answered before searching for the factors that influence the choice of military doctrine, because it would be meaningless if there were no chance to observe the possibility to change.

This chapter will focus on an analysis of the budget appropriations for the U.S. military from 2000 to 2009. The reason why I choose to examine the allocation of budget expenditures is that military posture should be based on where the money is invested. Without appropriate financial support, policies cannot be prepared and implemented. Therefore, by looking at the variation in budget allocations we can see how funding affects strategies, planning, and military posture. Another reason for examining budgets is related to the political competition between politicians and the military leadership. The budget is subject to approval by the Congress after the Executive branch submits the initial budget request. In this process, the original budget may be reduced or increased. These negotiations and resulting changes explain the tension regarding motives and policy between the Congress and the military leadership.

The time frame will be from 2000 to 2009 for two reasons. First, the military did not begin to become more seriously involved in the COIN debate until obstacles in the Iraqi and Afghan wars surfaced. The first draft of Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, was produced in October 2004 by Lieutenant Colonel Jan Horvath at the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth.¹⁸ The publication of the Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, occurred in 2006 after several revisions that were supervised by Lieutenant General David Petraeus, who commanded the Combined Armed Center (CAC) from 2005. The point in time when this doctrinal manual was published was a critical factor that influenced the possibility of a change in the choice of military doctrine since the assessment of the utility of COIN operations could not fairly be evaluated without

¹⁸ Conrad Crane, "United State," in *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*, edited by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (New York: Routledge, 2010).

being implemented. The effectiveness of the COIN operations during the two wars should be evaluated by both the military and politicians in order to enable them to make a decision whether or not to change the existing doctrine. Based on this, the trend in the allocation of military expenditures will be analyzed.

The data that I needed to collect required a detailed analysis of the military budget. This task was very challenging because there were not many data sets, which contained the specifications for a detailed budget allocation. This meant that I had to build a new data set focused on the quota of expenditures for conventional warfare and insurgency. The raw material that I analyzed was the ‘National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2010’ normally called the “Greenbook” published by the Department of Defense (DoD). Although this report contains only broad categories of the budget, some data became useful, such as the budgets for special operations forces, strategic forces and so on.

One problem I had to anticipate is that sometimes it can be difficult to distinguish between the various categories that comprise the budget expenditures. For example, an overall budget increase in the General Purpose Forces does not go to only to COIN. It may be utilized for conventional warfare as well. The boundary between the two categories is blurred and can be hard to draw.

However, it is clear that the size of the dual purpose spending increases and the ratio of the budget allocated to COIN rather than to conventional warfare got bigger as more emphasis was placed on a change of doctrine from conventional warfare to COIN.

Based on some recent work published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C., a classification of sub-categories for both conventional warfare and COIN has been suggested. Cordesman and Hammond

classified the budgets for strategic forces, Airlift and Sealift under conventional warfare, while money for special operations forces, army aircraft procurement and support for other nations fell under the COIN category.

These two categories fit well into single purpose sectors. Yet there were other budget categories which were difficult to classify because of their ambiguous nature, such as general purpose forces, research and development, etc. These categories were counted as dual purpose spending, and will be contrasted to the single purpose spending categories for conventional warfare.

If I found a pattern of budget allocations between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency, I investigated the characteristics of the two different doctrines in order to better understand them.

Chapter III: The Debate Regarding Conventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency

In order to understand the underlying factors that may affect doctrinal choice, the essence of each alternative should be thoroughly investigated. In this chapter, the debate between conventional warfare and COIN will be analyzed in a qualitative way using three criteria to compare these two groups, namely, their philosophical origins, perspectives on warfare, and the resources and capabilities needed for implementation.

This chapter will begin by observing two key actors, namely Gian Gentile and David Petraeus, each of whom presented a contrary approach for selecting doctrine. More attention will be paid to the origin of these two doctrines for two reasons. First, understanding the origin of a doctrine can reveal the reason why the U.S. military has concentrated on either a state centered or nonconventional approach. Second, this will lead the way to better understand why an irregular small army sometimes can defeat a larger regular army. Investigating the origin of a nonconventional doctrine can often

reveal how to prevail against it in an irregular war.

Chapter IV: The Role of Military Leadership in Changing Military Doctrine

In this chapter, a theoretical argument regarding the factors that influence doctrinal choice will emerge based on the analysis provided in previous chapters. Compared to other factors, such as institutional impact, political pressure, and international conditions, the role of the military leadership has been under-represented in contemporary literature, even though it is the key actor responsible for the implementation of doctrine. The role played by the military leadership will be explained by exploring an assimilation process that is defined as an activity that is reducing the gap between the military and civilian society.

There are several assumptions on which the assimilation process is based. The first is that military organizations are more conservative than civilian society. The military is organized based on a set of rules and laws which are resistant to change.¹⁹

Another assumption that must be considered is the heterogeneity of the military. Within the conservative military, not all members share the same degree of conservativeness. Individual members have their own level of rigidity affected by education, social interactions, etc. Though the military is more conservative than civilian society, the level of conservativeness is variable.

The third assumption is associated with the relationship between the characteristic of the military and the choice of doctrine. This means that a

¹⁹ Sarkesian, Williams and Bryant pointed out the special characteristics of the military the profession that are separate and distinct from society in general as well as other professions. They are 'a corporate-bureaucratic structure,' 'requirement for special knowledge and education,' 'professional self-regulation,' and 'a sense of professional calling and commitment.' Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Fred B Bryant, *Soldiers, Society, and National Security* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), 16.

conservative military tends to choose doctrine that is conservative and vice versa.

Lastly, conventional doctrine is one that focuses on state challengers with conventional troops involving mass maneuver of artillery, armor, and aircraft, while counterinsurgency, located on the opposite side of the conservatism scale, focuses on non-state actors using irregular tactics.

Based on these assumptions, I suggest that any activity that reduces the degree of conservatism in the military helps the military to choose a less conservative doctrine, including counterinsurgency. A civilian education offered to military officers is one of the assimilation processes that help create a less conservative military, especially as it regards a willingness to change and modify doctrine. When military leaders, who are involved in the decision making process, interact more frequently with civilian society, especially through the assimilation process of a civilian military education, they may discover that their orientation toward military doctrine tends to become less conservative. Based on this logic, three hypotheses are introduced at the end of this chapter.

Chapter V: A Game Theoretic Model for Determining Military Doctrine

The military leadership theory is illustrated by a game theoretic model in this chapter to present a general picture of how the military leadership affects change in military doctrine. A brief review of game theory will be mentioned and two models will be presented. The main purpose of introducing game theory models is to demonstrate the possibility that doctrinal choice can be attributed to a change in the characteristics of the military leadership. The traditional equilibrium in the conservative military leadership model is shifted to a new equilibrium in the less conservative military leadership model. Throughout these two models, the specific

conditions under which a certain doctrine is chosen are represented by a mathematical expression.

Chapter VI: A Statistical Model for Determining Military Doctrine

This chapter tests my theory that the military leadership plays an important role in doctrinal choice. The main independent variable is the percentage of the military leadership who had a chance to study in a civilian university after being commissioned. This proportion represents the degree of conservatism in the military leadership. The dependent variable is the proportion of the military budget allocated to strategic forces, which represents the degree of conservativeness in military doctrine. The greater the level of budget allocated for strategic forces the more conventionally focused is the doctrine.

Several control variables were also included for the purpose of avoiding a spurious relationship between the main variables. For domestic factors, presidential party affiliation, the unemployment rate, the party controlling the Congress, an election year, and an ongoing war were included. Cold war and state challenger factors were introduced for international variables. There were two interactive variables introduced for the purpose of grasping the interactive effect when one factor is conditioned on the other factor. They include the combined variables of the level of a civilian education and presidential party affiliation, and the level of a civilian education and ongoing war. This statistical test, which includes other factors that were expected to influence doctrinal choice, was offered to prove the validity of the theory that I propose.

Chapter VII: Conclusion

The conclusion includes answers to questions raised at the beginning of the project, the extent of policy implications and the direction of future research.

Contributions to Literature

This dissertation, as outlined, is a journey to build a theoretical explanation by unveiling links based on empirical evidence. I conclude this introductory chapter by addressing the contributions offered in this dissertation. Generally speaking, it contributes to the debate regarding conventional warfare versus counterinsurgency. Although there have been several debates in terms of the similarities and differences of these two doctrines, not much attention has been paid to their philosophical origin. The finding that the COIN doctrine is heavily influenced by Sun Tzu's preservation theory may induce a further polemic.

The conditions and links that this project will deliver will assist future researchers in understanding how and when military doctrine has changed. The relatively neglected role of the military leadership most likely alarms the civilian political leadership, who believe the military to be a mere implementer of their orders. Under democratic rule, the military should be subordinate to civilian authority. However, the consequence of this relationship is not often discussed. Does the military always follow what the civilian politicians ask them to do or does it attempt to build its own arena where it can be free from fluctuating political influences? The assimilation process with civilian society may have more impact on the decision making process in the military than building uniformity with governing politicians.

Chapter II

Patterns and Evidence Obtained from the Military Budget

As the Army has reset and reformed itself when it comes to doctrine, equipment, and training, it must use the eventual slackening of overseas deployments as an opportunity to attack the institutional and bureaucratic constipation of Big Army, and re-think the way it deals with the outstanding young leaders in its lower-and middle-ranks

Speech for the Graduation at West Point in 2011 by Robert Gates

Introduction

In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the United States of America began waging a Global War on Terror (GWOT) by invading two states consecutively, Afghanistan and Iraq. These two wars initially appeared to be successful, but their ultimate conclusion is indeterminate because kinetic military activity has not been entirely successful. Though military victory was declared after a few months in Iraq, the war is still not yet over.²⁰ The war process in Afghanistan is not much different. Less than two years after war was declared in Afghanistan, the U.S. transferred the center of its military operations to Iraq, believing that military operations in Afghanistan had been completed. However, the Afghan campaign has reemerged as the primary battle field. In both wars the enemy is not a traditional army, they are

²⁰ Though President Obama publicly announced the end of the military operation in Iraq in a speech at the Oval Office on 31 August 2010, still there will be U.S. involvement related to military with remaining 50,000 troops in stability operations under the name of "Operation New Dawn". <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-iraq-speech-president-mark-end-combat-operations/story?id=11525998> (accessed on September 2, 2010).

paramilitary forces engaged in insurgencies. These wars are non-traditional and asymmetrical, posing challenges to a U.S. Army that has mostly been trained for and practiced traditional war.

The U.S. has preferred conventional warfare with their ancillary military doctrines while considering COIN as an ephemeral anomaly.²¹ Cassidy suggests that “one characteristic of this preferred way of war has been an embrace of the direct use of military force, combining maneuver and firepower to mass combat power at the decisive point in order to bring about the destruction or annihilation of some enemy force or army.”²² Contrasted with conventional warfare, COIN has different characteristics.

Roughly speaking, COIN warfare is based on David Galula’s four principles: the assistance of population as a necessity for the counterinsurgency; support gained through an active minority; conditional support from the population; and intense and vast efforts and means.²³ COIN entails a strategy of pursuing the support of the population through close contact with the people. Changes in the demands of warfare should require an alteration of doctrines, organizational structures, and practices within the military in order to obtain success under new conditions. For the U.S., unfortunately, this adaptation has occurred but not completely. Rid and Keaney argue that “it is no surprise that an army shuns learning lessons from painful defeat,” indicating that there was not much effort to move away from a conventional warfare doctrine.²⁴

²¹ Robert K. Cassidy, *COIN and the Global War on Terror: Military Couture and Irregular War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 99-103.

²² Ibid., 3.

²³ David Galula, *COIN Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Praeger Security International, [1964] 2006).

²⁴ Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney, “COIN in Context,” *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*, Ed. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (New York:

It would not be fair to say, however, that there has not been an effort to develop a COIN doctrine within the U.S. military. The U.S. has developed a COIN doctrine for the purpose of dealing with this kind of unconventional warfare since the Vietnam War.²⁵ Nevertheless, whether the U.S. actually has haltingly implemented this strategy or not needs to be investigated because an actual change in the doctrine should be accompanied by budgetary adjustments and organizational modifications that would be endorsed by the military leadership and the civilian political leadership.

In this chapter, I try to answer the question of whether the U.S. military doctrine has changed from conventional warfare to COIN, while being engaged in two simultaneous wars (Iraq and Afghanistan). Since these two doctrines require different military capabilities and troop formations, an analysis of budget allocations should reveal whether real changes in priorities, doctrines, and military practice have occurred. The trends and evidence of military budget allocations are the main target of this analysis. This chapter is organized into four sections, namely, a brief analysis of the two doctrines, an analytical framework, an analysis of data and findings, and discussions and conclusion.

Conventional Warfare and COIN Doctrines

For the analytical purposes of this chapter, I introduce a distinction between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency. Conventional war is warfare against

Routledge, 2010), 257.

²⁵ Conrad Crane, "United States," *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*, Ed. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keane (New York: Routledge, 2010) 59-70. For the analysis of a reason of failure in COIN doctrine, see John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: The University Press of Chicago Press, 2007) and Andrew T H. Tan, *U.S. Strategy Against Global Terrorism: How It Evolved, Why It Failed, and Where It is Headed* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). For general understanding of the difference between conventional warfare and COIN, see The U.S. Army and Marines Corps, *COIN Field Manual* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).

another state's regular army while COIN warfare involves fighting against a non-state actor or armed groups that are indistinguishable from civilians.

In order to understand the choice between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency, the essence of each alternative should be investigated. One very good way of grasping these differences is to understand the debate between two key actors, namely, Gian Gentile who is an ardent supporter of conventional warfare and David Petraeus who has become a reputable authority on COIN doctrine. Bacevich framed this debate as actors in the two camps of Conservatives and Crusaders.²⁶ According to Bacevich, the Crusaders are those who believe that the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars arguably present a new type of warfare which the United States faces and that this type of warfare may dominate in the future. The Conservatives are those who think that altering the U.S. military doctrine to include the transformation of failed states is a dangerous idea.²⁷

The first group that supports COIN has several scholars and military officers in addition to General Petraeus²⁸ including John Nagl (a West Pointer and Rhodes Scholar with a doctorate from Oxford University),²⁹ David Galula (*Counterinsurgency Warfare*), Steven Metz and Raymond Millen (*Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*), David Kilcullen (*Counterinsurgency*), and others. According to their analyses, insurgent armies employ a large number of small unit insurgents, terrorists, or guerrillas who rely upon support from the population and who can thrive

²⁶ Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Petraeus Doctrine," *The Atlantic*, October 2008, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2008/10/the-petraeus-doctrine/6964/> (accessed on October 4, 2010).

²⁷ For the detailed summary of each view, see Shawn Brimley, "Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives," <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/113-brimley.pdf> (accessed on October 30, 2010).

²⁸ Crane, "United States," 59-72.

²⁹ Bacevich, "The Petraeus Doctrine," 2-3.

in weak and failing states.³⁰ This trend is well exemplified by the two wars in which the U.S. is engaged now. Therefore, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be the prototype of a new war that may become predominant in the future, and the experience learned from these campaigns should be applied to the design of military focuses and doctrine.³¹

COIN warfare requires a population-centric approach (protection of people) rather than an enemy-centric approach.³² In order to implement this COIN doctrine, soldiers must not only implement kinetic military operations, they must also deal with civil affairs, including education, stability operations, building infrastructure, and so on. In addition to these, the role of intelligence about dispersed insurgents is critical to COIN operations.³³ Close connection with locally affected populations offers the opportunity for needed human intelligence with which counterinsurgent forces can find insurgents who cannot be found through satellite and remote observations.

On the other hand, opponents of COIN are skeptical about a multi-purpose military that not only is capable of kinetic military operations but also may be engaged in nation building of failed states. The key advocate within this group is Gian Gentile, an Army Colonel, who had two combat tours in Iraq.³⁴ His main assertion is that COIN warfare may over-commit what the U.S. military can do, leading to a loss in war-fighting skills.³⁵ This argument is supported by several scholars including Edward Luttwak, Stephen Biddle, Frank Hoffman and even General George W. Casey,

³⁰ Brimley, "Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives," 2.

³¹ David H. Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," *Doctrine #13*, October 2007.

³² David J. Kilcullen, *COIN* (New York, Oxford University Press 2010) 8-10.

³³ Galula, *COIN Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 50.

³⁴ Bacevich, "The Petraeus Doctrine" 3.

³⁵ Gian P. Gentile, "Think Again: Counterinsurgency," *Foreign Policy*, Jan 13 2009. And the same argument can be found in Gian P. Gentile, "Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars," *Joint Force Quarterly* (1st Quarter 2009).

the Army Chief of Staff from 2007 to 2011.³⁶

This group does not reject the existence of asymmetric insurgent warfare but they warn that a conventional threat still exists and that it may reemerge as China rises in the Asian theater. They argue further that the American military cannot transform whole societies of weak and failing states simply because “American power has limits.”³⁷ Gentile also argues that an enemy-centric approach might be also necessary in some cases and “the Army is moving too far and too fast in the direction of reorienting to irregular warfare or French models of revolutionary warfare.”³⁸ They argue that the currently organized American Army and Marine Corps are more than sufficient to wage the counterinsurgencies and the attempt to shift the U.S. military for a long war of COIN leads America to possibly failing to defend against a potential conventional military challenger.³⁹

Based on the above debate, different military capabilities are needed to implement either conventional warfare or counterinsurgency. A military that emphasizes COIN needs troops of smaller size that can implement population based operations, while conventional warfare doctrine requires building heavy weapon systems to fight against state challengers using conventional weapons. This does not mean, however, that the U.S. military needs to choose one approach at the expense of the other. Rather, it implies that there is a change in the degree of emphasis between these doctrines, so that the U.S. could be prepared to fight a variety of threats. These differences should be reflected somewhere in military publications. A reasonable starting point is the military budget, since it will reveal any changes that actually

³⁶ Crane, “United States,” 59-72.

³⁷ Brimley, “Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives,” 1.

³⁸ Crane, “United States,” 69.

³⁹ Brimley, “Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives,” 1-2.

occur. This may reveal the possibility that a change has actually occurred.

Analytical Framework

Defense Budget and Counterinsurgency

Before analyzing the sub-categories of military expenditures, skimming through a general trend of military budgets is necessary in order to see the bigger picture. Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the base military budget of the U.S. has grown by an average of four percent per year after taking inflation into account.⁴⁰ This increase is not surprising if the effects of the unprecedented attack on the mainland of the U.S. in 2001 and two consecutive wars are considered, but is surprising when considering the unparalleled economic recession that the U.S. has been suffering in the midst of two wars. This steady growth in the military budget needs to be explained.

A survey of several ‘think tanks’ whose research focuses on military budgets may tell us how to start the analysis of military budget allocations. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) offers periodical reports dealing with resource allocations that promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options.⁴¹ Analysis of the Defense Budget each year by Todd Harrison describes how defense budgets are allocated and what future military budgets may look like. This analysis is based on major funding categories including Operations and Support, Acquisition, Military Construction and Family Housing, all of which have specified sub-programs.⁴² The unique merit of this report

⁴⁰ Travis Sharp, “Vision Meets Reality: 2010 QDR and 2011 Defense Budget,” Policy Brief in Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/2011DefenseBudget_Sharp_Feb2010_code_904_policybrf_1.pdf (accessed on December 30, 2010).

⁴¹ CSBA Mission Statement, http://www.csbaonline.org/2006-1/5.AboutUs/Mission_Statement.php (accessed on January 10, 2010).

⁴² As for the sub-programs under Operations and Support, there are Military Personnel,

is the comprehensive examination of major acquisition programs that include budgets for Aircraft, Ground Systems, Shipbuilding, and so on. Though this annual report offers an in-depth description of the military budget, it does not specifically delineate the funds being used for COIN versus conventional warfare.

Several analyses from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) and the Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA) present an evaluation of military budget usage in a different way by comparing it to non-military areas. Richard Kogan in CBPP offers evidence that the defense budget is growing rapidly as a share of the total budget, while domestic concerns have shrunk.⁴³ In the same vein, Carl Conetta from PDA investigates the reasons that make this surge in the military budget happen at the expense of the domestic constituency by arguing that “[i]mportantly, the post-9/11 wars are not more than half the cause. Moreover, these wars have themselves proved to be far more expensive in real terms than their immediate predecessors, which only adds to the explanatory burden.”⁴⁴ This finding implies that there was an urgent need for the military and civilian politicians to invest more money even during the economic downturn. It may be that unconventional warfare has different characteristics than the conventional war that the U.S. had prepared to fight, and

Trends in Military Pay and Benefits, Military Healthcare, Operation and Maintenance, DoD Civilian Personnel, and Classified O&M. For more information, see Todd Harrison, “Analysis of the FY 2011 Defense Budget,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100629.Analysis_of_the_FY/R.20100629.Analysis_of_the_FY.pdf (accessed on December 10, 2010).

⁴³ Richard Kogan, “Federal Spending, 2001 through 2008: Defense is a Rapidly Growing Share of the Budget, While Domestic Appropriations Have Shrunk,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities <http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=125> (accessed on December 5, 2010). For further findings see Ricard Koran, “War, Tax Cuts, and The Deficit,” and “Non-Defense Appropriations and The Congressional Budget Plan,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (accessed on December 5, 2010).

⁴⁴ Carl Conetta, “An Undisciplined Defense: Understanding the \$2 Trillion Surge in US Defense Spending,” Project on Defense Alternative Briefing Report #20 (2010), <http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1001PDABR20.pdf> (January 5, 2011), and “Trillions to Burn? A Quick Guide to the Surge in Pentagon Spending,” <http://www.comw.org/pda/1002BudgetSurge.html> (accessed on January 4, 2011).

therefore requires additional funds.

The increase in the military budget, specifically the basic budget, in many parts can be attributed to the different characteristics of the war that the U.S. is fighting. Travis Sharp from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) presents an interesting suggestion in terms of the reference for determining the reasonable level of the military budget by arguing that the DoD budget as a percentage of GDP is below the average DoD budget since 1948 and four percent of GDP should be a baseline for the defense base budget – contrary to the assertion that the current military budget should be reduced.⁴⁵ Trying to explain the sustained high growth of the DoD budget, he highlights the role of an uncertain geopolitical future that demands an increase in the end-strength size of the Army and Marine Corps,⁴⁶ which I think, are the main forces for COIN operations. This insinuates that the change in the disposition of services for COIN has already occurred or at least the alteration is being implemented.

The base DoD budget has been increased to the highest level in real terms during these two wars even excluding war costs. This trend may come from the cost to adjust the U.S. military to new threats that are non-state actors and insurgents. Based on the recent work from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C., a classification of sub-categories for either conventional warfare or COIN has been suggested in order to determine what kind of budget is suitable for each purpose. Cordesman and Hammond describe budgets for Strategic Forces, Airlift, and Sealift as conventional warfare preparation, while money for

⁴⁵ The current DoD base budget request (2011) equals 3.5 percent of GDP and 14 percent of projected federal outlays. For more accurate statistics, see Travis Sharp, “Vision Meets Reality: 2010 QDR and 2011 Defense Budget,” 3-4.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 5.

Special Operations Forces, Army Aircraft Procurement and C3, Intel & Space fall into the COIN category.⁴⁷ This attempt offers a reasonable starting point for analyzing the allocations of the defense budget.

Defense Budget and Strategic Missions

In the process of analyzing military expenditures, I have tried to divide them based on the usage of the budget. The debate between COIN and conventional warfare described above shows that the military needs different types of military equipment, troop organization, and skills for counterinsurgency. Therefore, a specific portion of the budget that is closely related to COIN should increase if there has been a change in military doctrine toward counterinsurgency.

The military expenditures that I have examined were based on the *National Defense Budget Estimates* published by the DoD. There are eleven programs⁴⁸ under the military budget, namely, programs for Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, C3, Intelligence & Space, Mobility Forces, Guard & Reserve Forces, Research & Development, Central Supply & Maintenance, Training, Medical & Other, Administration & Associations, Support of Other Nations, and Special Operations Forces.⁴⁹ I categorized these eleven programs into three groups: budgets for counterinsurgency, conventional warfare, and dual purpose spending.

It was sometimes difficult to distinguish how to allocate expenditures


⁴⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert Hammond, *Unplanning for Uncertainty: Reshaping Future Defense Plans* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 12.

⁴⁸ In early 1960s Secretary of Defense McNamara introduced a Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), which was designed to emphasize the link between planning and budgeting by examining the budget in terms of output related programs in Lee D. Olvey, James R. Golden, and Robert C. Kelly, *The Economics of National Security* (Wayne: Avery Publishing Group 1984), 91.

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimate for FY 2009* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2008), 80.

between the two opposite categories. For example, a budget increase for general purpose forces may not only go to support COIN, but also may be spent for conventional warfare purposes. It was a difficult task to discern the boundary between the two categories.

Based on the primitive classification by Cordesman and Hammond, although their classification does not completely correspond to those programs listed in the budget, it offers a reasonable base line for categorizing such programs into three groups. Despite the fact that the authors did not specify the reason why they classified these programs, it is possible to justify their classifications by analyzing the attributes of each program and matching them with the characteristics of the different types of warfare.



<Figure 2.1: Budget Allocation for Specific Purposes >

Strategic Forces includes nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, which cannot be used for non-state actors using guerrilla tactics. The same can be said about Mobility Forces that are used for transporting large units of troops by sea and air. Though these troops can be utilized for COIN purpose once they are deployed, the main goal of sealift and airlift is dedicated to conventional warfare.

Regarding programs for counterinsurgency, the U.S. military Special

Operations Forces are the main pillar for engaging an unconventional enemy. However, most funding for COIN purposes may be found under the rubric “Command, Control and Communications, Intelligence and Space” (for short, C3, Intel and Space). This program provides troops with the appropriate means for identifying a hidden enemy. While conventional warfare troops benefit from the development of this program as well, they do not need the same level of precision in their actions.

Applying their classification to eleven programs, I grouped Strategic Forces and Mobility Forces under the conventional warfare preparation. In terms of the COIN budget, the allocations for Special Operations Forces and C3, Intel and Space programs were regarded as being spent on counterinsurgency. Yet there are other budget categories which were hard to classify because of their ambiguous nature such as general purpose forces, research and development, and so on. These categories were counted under dual purpose spending.

Conventional Warfare	Dual Purpose	Counterinsurgency
	<i>General Purpose Forces</i>	
	<i>Guard & Reserve Forces</i>	
<i>Strategic forces</i>	<i>Research & Development</i>	<i>Special Operations</i>
<i>Mobility Forces</i>	<i>Central Supply & Maintenance</i>	<i>Forces</i>
	<i>Training Medical & Other</i>	<i>C3, Intel & Space</i>
	<i>Administration & Association</i>	
	<i>Support of Other Nations</i>	

<Table 2.1: Classification of Defense Budget Program >

Preliminary Hypotheses

In order to reach the goal of this chapter, specifically, to understand whether

there was a change in the pattern of military spending during the past ten years, it is necessary to understand whether military doctrines and operations actually shifted from conventional to unconventional warfare. To accomplish that task, I need to demonstrate two distinct tendencies. First and foremost, it is crucial to show that while spending in one category has been increasing, spending in the other has been decreasing. However, the existence of this trend is not conclusive evidence that the increase in funding for unconventional warfare can be directly traced to a decrease in the funding for conventional warfare, since I do not know how the funding under the dual purpose budget has been disseminated. Therefore, I need to analyze the changes under the dual purpose categories. If I find that the dual-purpose spending remained constant while the specific purpose spending changed, I can uncover the how the redistribution of budget allocations changed from one purpose to the other, and so verify whether a shift in the military doctrine and allocations actually occurred. This reasoning can be summarized in two hypotheses as follows.

PH1: If there is a change in military doctrine from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency, the budget for COIN should increase while the budget for conventional warfare should decrease.


PH2: If there is a priority shift from conventional warfare to COIN during the same period of time the dual purpose spending should not change.

Data Analysis and Findings

This project focuses on an analysis of budget appropriations for the U.S. military from 2000 to 2009. By looking at the variation in budget allocations I can see how funding

affects strategies, planning, and military posture. Another reason for examining budgets is related to the political competition between politicians and the military leadership. The budget as presented by the Executive Branch needs to be approved by the Congress. In this process, the President’s original budget may be reduced or increased. These changes and negotiations can explain some of the tensions and differences in policy that exist between the Congress and the military leadership.

The time frame examined will be from 2000 to 2009 for two reasons. First, the military did not begin to become more seriously engaged in COIN until obstacles in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars surfaced. The first draft of the Field Manual (FM) (Interim) 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, was produced in October 2004 by Lieutenant Colonel Jan Horvath at the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth.⁵⁰ The publication of the FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, occurred in 2006 after several revisions supervised by Lieutenant General David Petraeus, who commanded the Combined Armed Center (CAC) from 2005. The timeframe during which this manual was published was a critical factor that influenced the possibility of a change in the choice of a military doctrine. The second reason involves an assessment of the utility of COIN operations.




<Graph 2.1: Absolute Aggregated Budget Allocation for Specific Purposes >

⁵⁰ Crane, “United States,” 59.

When I analyzed the Department of Defense budget report for 2009,⁵¹ I focused on both the total budget and the ratios allocated to conventional and COIN warfare. I built a budget for COIN and conventional warfare by aggregating the programs that could be categorized under each group. After this, each aggregated budget was calculated based on a ratio to reflect degrees of emphasis.

The absolute amount of the aggregated budget is shown in Graph 2.1. Based on this analysis, the U.S. military tended to increase the budget for COIN in absolute terms during the years (2000-2009), while there is no clear trend for the conventional warfare budget. The interesting thing I found here is that both budgets have been *decreased* since 2007, since the total amount of defense spending decreased in subsequent years. To get an even clearer picture, the share of the budget for each of the special purposes (i.e. the ratio) should be analyzed in order to assess which doctrine has attracted more attention to itself.



<Graph 2.2: The Ratio of Aggregated Budget Allocation for Specific Purposes >

⁵¹ In this chapter, I used only base budget of DoD excluding spending on ‘oversea contingency operations’ which is called war budget because this kind of budget will disappear after the end of war and does not reflect the change in military doctrine.

The trend for spending ratios is clearer than that for absolute expenditures. Graph 2.2 shows that the budget for COIN has been gradually increasing while the budget for conventional warfare has had the opposite trend. Though there are ups and downs on the allocations for both budgets the general direction of the budget trend seems to be obvious. However, is this trend statistically significant? I introduced an equation for the purpose of assessing the significance.

$$BA_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Year}_t + \beta_2 \text{Type}_t + \beta_3 (\text{Year}_t * \text{Type}_t) + \text{Budget Allocation}_{t-1} + \varepsilon$$

This equation accounts for the trend of budget allocations by year and by the two categories, namely, COIN or conventional warfare funding. By use of this equation, I can tell whether there is a certain trend in budget allocations and if the difference between the two types is meaningful or not. “Budget Allocation (BA)” is a dependent variable which is expressed by the ratio of each budget group over the total defense expenditure. “Year” variable ranges from 2000 to 2009. ”Type” is a dichotomous variable; zero stands for conventional warfare spending and one is counterinsurgency. Coefficient β_1 stands for the conventional warfare budget because type is zero, while the summation of coefficient β_1 and β_3 expresses the slope of the COIN budget allocation by year. I also include the lag dependent variable because the annual budget is planned based on last year’s budget. This tendency may cause an autocorrelation problem. In order to avoid this hidden effect, a one year lagged dependent variable is included in the model.

With this equation and the data that I calculated based on defense budgets from 2000 to 2009, I ran a simple linear regression. Model I tested the absolute

amount of the budget allocated to either conventional warfare or counterinsurgency. The results demonstrate that there is no typical trend in the budget allocation for conventional warfare by year as the coefficient is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the budget for COIN appears to grow over time. As for the analysis of absolute numbers, I can tell that there is a conspicuous increasing tendency in the budget allocation for COIN, while no tendency for conventional warfare is displayed.

Variables	Model I (Absolute Numbers)		Model II (Relative Numbers)	
Year	218.8(539.9)	-217.2(652.4)	-.002(.0005)***	-.003(.001)**
Type	19133.7(4737.1)***	13229.7(7010)	.054(.005)***	.067(.020)***
Year*Type	4791.1(763.5)***	2112(1807)	.006(.001)***	.007(.002)***
Lag Dependent		.51(.31)		-.247(.358)
Constant	225728.3(3349.7)***	14656(8386)	.065(0.003)***	.06(.02)***
N ⁵²	20	18	20	18
R-Squared		0.97		0.99
***: p<0.001, **: p<0.05				

<Table 2.2: Budget Allocation by Type and Year>

Model II tested the trend in the change of the ratio of each budget over the total defense budget and produced more noticeable results. The conventional warfare budget has had a decreasing trend over time. The negative significant coefficient points at the direction of the budget allocation for conventional warfare. As for the COIN budget, it has been significantly increasing from a statistical point of view as time goes by. This result implies that the ratio of the budget allocation has an observable trend and that the emphasis of U.S. military doctrine is shifting towards counterinsurgency. Another finding that should be highlighted is the coefficient of the interaction term which stands for the difference between constituent terms, type and

⁵² Though the time period is ten years, the number of observations is double because when I have made an interaction term and dichotomous variable, each year should have two observations for each dummy variable. And the unit of analysis is spending type – year.

year. This is positive and significant. This offers another trend related to these two budget allocations, which indicate that the difference between the two is getting bigger as time goes by. The trend of the difference is divergent at least during the period that this model analyzes.

This statistical model leads me to conclude that there is an observable trend in the budget allocation favoring COIN at the cost of conventional warfare during the period studied.


Discussions and Conclusion

The above conclusion may be viewed as tentative because of the existence of dual purpose programs, for which I may not be able to clearly delineate between COIN and conventional operations. At this point, I will scrutinize this possibility in order to make our tentative conclusion plausible.

It has been a quite difficult task to deal with the dual purpose budget. Given the fact that the sub-categories of each program are not available, simply assuming these programs are equally dedicated to both conventional warfare and COIN may be problematic. I approached this problem as a trade-off between the two groups. This was also the reason why I focused on the ratio rather than the absolute amount of the budget allocation. This chapter focuses on the change in emphasis on the two doctrines, which means that the U.S. military does not choose one doctrine at the expense of the other. With what this starting point implies, I can assume that one area's reduction should be traded off to the other area. Namely the budget decrease in the conventional warfare group is transferred to an increase in the COIN leaving the middle group unchanged.

If this reasoning is tenable, the dual purpose expenditure should not be changing a lot during the period that I tested. The overall trend including dual purposed budget is shown in Graph 2.3.

As shown in the graph, the trend of the dual purpose budget does not have a clear proclivity. However, the graph itself does not tell whether that is meaningful or not. In order to tell what statistical meaning it has, I ran a simple regression as a dependent variable against year. The results illustrate says that there is no statistical significant slope in the dual purposed budget allocation. This implies that most of the dual purpose budget has been kept at a stable level while there has been a budget transfer from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency. This evidence can also support the priority shift from conventional warfare to COIN, while keeping ordinary activities unchanged. Though this attempt cannot deliver a clear solution to the problem, at least it helps to clarify the possible relationship among these budget allocation groups.



<Graph 2.3: Aggregated Budget Allocation for All Purposes >

To answer the second question regarding other connections that may reveal whether or not a doctrinal change has occurred, there are several possible explanations including organizational changes involving the composition of troops as well as domestic and international factors that affect changes in military doctrine.

The goal of this chapter was to find patterns and evidence of a possible change in military doctrine during the period (2000-2009) pursuant to a presidential and military command decision to change doctrine in favor of counterinsurgency. The budgetary analysis contained herein offers reasonable evidence to conclude that a change has occurred while additional research may be required to answer ancillary questions.

These findings here may be temporary. For this trend to endure, organizational change must persist. Based on the debate between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency, an organizational shift within the Army towards having a larger number of small units of troops that are dedicated to COIN is expected. The next phase of research should focus on the question of whether there has been a shift in emphasis among military services regarding their composition. For the moment, however, the evidence provided leads me to the conclusion that the COIN doctrine has risen as a priority within the U.S. military.

Chapter III

The Debate Regarding Conventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency

Introduction

The evidence provided in the previous chapter established that during the period from 2000 to 2009 the U.S. COIN budget slightly increased while the conventional warfare budget decreased. This chapter is dedicated to examining the underlying debates regarding COIN and conventional warfare for the purpose of evaluating whether or not this trend is durable.

Military doctrine helps to organize the military's posture, weapon systems, and recruitment plans. Differences in doctrine help determine which branch of the armed forces will grow and what combat skills and training will be emphasized. An investigation of the evolution of military doctrine can help us to understand why the U.S. military may or may not be willing to adapt to changing circumstances regarding warfare. Despite the U.S. military's severe reversals in the Vietnam War—which was primarily a guerrilla war—the U.S. Army, during the war and afterward, continued to focus on building its conventional warfare capabilities. It continued to view guerrilla

warfare as atypical.⁵³ This failure to adjust doctrine contributed to the debacles of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. Debates about doctrine may give clues about struggles within the military community about adapting to changing circumstances. In addition, the comprehensive analysis of doctrine may help us grasp changes in how war should be conducted. Although there is not a consensus that warfare has fundamentally changed,⁵⁴ the debate between proponents of conventional warfare versus COIN will be of use for researchers who are interested in the broader concept of military doctrine.

In investigating the debate between these two doctrinal options, I focused on two key actors: Gian Gentile, an ardent supporter of conventional warfare, and David Petraeus, a reputable authority on COIN doctrine. I will contrast their views according to three criteria: philosophical origins, perspectives on warfare, and resources needed to wage war. Besides these, I will analyze the factors that prompt change in military doctrine, and the effects of doctrine upon warfare and war fighting capabilities.

This chapter is composed of five parts. I start by reviewing the circumstances under which the debate over military doctrine has emerged. A comparative analysis of Gentile's and Petraeus's doctrines will follow in the next three sections. Finally, the fifth section deals with implications and lessons from this debate.

The Onset of the Debate

Before exploring these two doctrinal approaches we need to examine what happened

⁵³ Richard A. Lacquement, Jr. "In the Army Now," *The American Interest Magazine*, September-October 2010, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=860> (accessed on October 31, 2010).

⁵⁴ Steven Metz and Phillip Cuccia, *2010 SSI Annual Strategy Conference Report: Defining War for the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011).

during the Cold War Era and afterwards to understand why the debate over doctrine has occurred. After World War II, the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was dominated by a nuclear arms race that raised international fear that a nuclear exchange could destroy the whole world. This concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) deterred these two states from conducting or initiating a nuclear war. Cold War doctrine emphasized intercontinental ballistic missiles, technology, and conventional arms for the purpose of obtaining an advantage over the enemy, creating an atmosphere of mutual deterrence. According to Kipp and Grau, “Conventional maneuver war was to occur at the operational level under nuclear-threat. The nuclear balance of terror dominated international relations and restrained risk, so antagonists poked at each other using proxies in limited contests.”⁵⁵

This kind of two-state contention ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The demise of the communist superpower should have opened a door for potential opponents of the US to challenge its world police status, but the U.S.’s quick and complete operational success in Kuwait in 1991 demonstrated that a U.S. military that was equipped and trained with advanced technology could not be beaten by conventional forces.⁵⁶

Due to the successful outcome of Operation Desert Storm the U.S. military believed that it had recovered from the debacle of the Vietnam War and that conventional warfare would be the appropriate military doctrine to sustain its position in the world. At the same time, other potential enemies started to search for new ways to confront the U.S. The pursuit of alternative strategies by those who did not accept the U.S. defined world order included the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. territory. In order to

⁵⁵ Jacop W. Kipp and Lester W. Grau, “Military Theory, Strategy, and Praxies,” *Military Review* (March-April 2011), 17.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 17.

avenge these attacks, the U.S. waged two consecutive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have not progressed as expected. Initially military operations seemed to achieve success. However, subsequent military operations have been less successful and have been politically and militarily costly. There have been continuing disturbances and irregular nonconventional attacks on U.S. troops, and the stability of a post-conflict society has been difficult to obtain.

In the midst of the Iraq War, the U.S. military started to reevaluate how to fight against irregular opponents, and reintroduced the concept of COIN. Rather than shelling possible bases where enemies were believed to be stationed and searching and killing individual insurgents hiding among the civilian population, the U.S. put into play new lessons that could be applied to the Iraq war: focusing on the civilian population, working across boundaries, exercising initiatives, and trying to instill democratic values to the battlefield.⁵⁷ The introduction of a COIN campaign, known as ‘the surge’ in 2007, was successful enough to turn the tide in Iraq from stalemate to progress. The improved stability in Iraq produced several positive effects on U.S. military COIN operations. Based on David Ucko’s analysis in his book *The New Counterinsurgency Era*, the success of the surge produced a new consensus among military and civilian leaders that COIN was the right approach to win an unconventional war. Other services at the Pentagon were induced to follow this approach, and General Petraeus and his supporters obtained more power to make their voices heard.⁵⁸ Eventually, the COIN doctrine gained momentum in Washington.

However, the success of the COIN operations did not get support from all

⁵⁷ David Petraeus, “COIN Concepts: What We Learned in Iraq,” *Global Policy* (Vol. 1 Issue 1, January 2010). 116.

⁵⁸ David H. Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009).

quarters, and so gave birth to the counter-counterinsurgency movement. Particularly, some questioned the effect that irregular warfare would have on conventional operations. Because COIN operations emphasized non-military operations such as building bridges, medical support, educating students, and even further nation-building, Gian Gentile and his supporters expressed deep anxiety that armed forces were losing their other important skills and missions: infantry, artillery, and tank warfare.⁵⁹ Andrew Bacevich described the latter group as Conservatives who supported a traditional role of armed forces, while naming COIN proponents as Crusaders.⁶⁰ Conservatives want to wage war traditionally by focusing on kinetic engagements. Crusaders advocate counterinsurgency. We need to investigate what are the unique characteristics of the U.S. armed forces in order to determine a reasonable starting point for the analysis of the debate.

Philosophical Origins of Two Alternate Strategies

The philosophical basis for the preference for conventional warfare had origins in the writings of military strategists Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri de Jomini, while their tactical bases lay in the victories of the greatest military officer of the nineteenth century, Napoleon Bonaparte.

Von Clausewitz defined the relationship between politics and the military in his famous phrase “[W]ar is a mere continuation of policy by other means.”⁶¹ He explained that “[W]ar is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument,

⁵⁹ Gian P. Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (1st Quarter, 2009), 27-30. See his other article, “The Death of the Armor Corps,” *Small War Journal*, April 17, 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/the-death-of-the-armor-corps/> (accessed on December 12, 2010).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 1.

⁶¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1832[1968]). 119.

a continuation of political commerce a carrying out of the same by other means. ... War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.”⁶²

In contrast to von Clausewitz, de Jomini focused on a more practical development of armed forces by interpreting the Napoleonic experience. He elaborated on certain principles that he believed were generally applicable to military warfare.⁶³ De Jomini proposed that the fundamental principle for war embraced four maxims:

1. a mass strategic movement of troops to the decisive locations within a theater;
2. maneuvering to engage cleavages within the hostile army;
3. throwing mass force upon a decisive point and;
4. doing all these things with the proper timing and energy.⁶⁴

His Newtonian principle of warfare involved mass maneuvers involving strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering, and diplomacy.⁶⁵ His main contribution to military theory was that the key to warfare involved strategies based on scientific principles and emphasizing massive battles of annihilation combined with effective logistics.⁶⁶ John Shy epitomizes the core of de Jomini’s theory of warfare as:

That strategy is the key to warfare
That all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and
That these principles prescribe *offensive action to mass force* against weaker enemy forces at some *decisive point* if strategy is to lead to

⁶² Ibid. 119.

⁶³ John Osgood, “Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini and Military Strategy,” <http://www.juris99.com/mil/w12.htm>, (accessed on April 4, 2011).

⁶⁴ Baron Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell and Lt. W.P. Craighill (New York: West Point, 1862[2004]), 70.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 13.

⁶⁶ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Michigan: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 17.

victory (Italic original).⁶⁷

In terms of the identification of a decisive point, de Jomini said that “[i]t is a point whose attack or capture would imperil or seriously weaken the enemy. It could be a road junction, a river crossing, a mountain pass, a supply base, or an open flank of the enemy army itself.”⁶⁸ For de Jomini a key strategic concept involved the ‘interior versus exterior line of operations.’ Shy explains this by saying that “It refers to the simple idea that one side may have a position between—‘inside’—separated enemy forces. This massive troop maneuver to a decisive point involves territorially based warfare whose objective is annihilation of enemy. This territorially based military operation has been the way that the U.S. has prepared for war since it was founded. Michael Howard said that many generals during the Civil War fought in the battle field “with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War in the other ... Jomini’s writings were transfused into the military thought of the Civil War, which was so important in the development of basic patterns of modern battlefield procedure.”⁶⁹

De Jomini did provide commentary regarding irregular warfare. He called them wars of opinion, including civil, religious, or national war. In contrast to his general objective of finding scientific principles of warfare, de Jomini “left a strong suggestion that the whole subject (of irregular wars) sickened him, and the clear implication that any military power would do well to avoid involving itself in national or civil wars.”⁷⁰ The reluctance to engage in irregular warfare originating from de Jomini’s sentiment is reflected by the famous phrase during the Vietnam War that it

⁶⁷ John Shy, “Jomini,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 146.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 154.

⁶⁹ Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace* (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), 30-31.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 171.

was a war undertaken at the wrong time and place with the wrong enemy.⁷¹

Another essential aspect of U.S. military doctrine involves the relationship between political leadership and military leadership. This separation of military affairs from politics has materialized in American military culture in a unique way. The U.S. military's traditional culture of civil-military relations was publically expressed by General George Washington and theoretically expressed by Samuel Huntington. The United States of America, founded as a democracy rather than a monarchy, demanded a new relationship between the government and the military, with the civilian leadership in control. The tradition of subordinating the military to the civilian leadership originated at the end of the Revolutionary War when George Washington thwarted a mutiny plotted by discontented military officers at Newburgh, New York, in 1783.⁷² As the Revolutionary War approached its end, the Revolutionary Army began demobilization. However, budget shortages during the war had made it difficult for Congress to pay officers and soldiers, some of whom had considerable back pay due. In addition to this, what mattered worse was Congress's promise in 1780 that officers would be paid a life-time pension of half-pay and that the enlisted men could receive a special bonus of eighty dollars.⁷³ However, Congress did not have the capability to keep this promise and because soldiers feared that they might be repudiated and abandoned, they started a rebellion.

⁷¹ Robert M. Cassidy, *COIN and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 130.

⁷² Department of The Army, Field Manual 1: *The Army*, (Headquarters Department of The Army, 2005), 1-5. This mutiny is generally called Newburgh Conspiracy. For more details about the Newburgh Conspiracy see Robert F. Jones, *George Washington: Ordinary Man, Extraordinary Leader* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 83-86, and John E. Ferling, *The First of Men: A Life of George Washington* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 309-312.

⁷³ George L. Marshall, Jr., "The Rise and Fall of the Newburgh Conspiracy," Archiving Early America, <http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/fall97/wshngton.html> (accessed on July 5, 2011).

The commander-in-chief of the Continental Army, George Washington, found himself in a dilemma when he learned that a group of military officers were plotting a seditious meeting for securing the past pay and pensions that Congress had promised. Washington, when faced with the choice of supporting officers of his army or the Congress as a representative of the people, sided with the Congress by reinforcing the concept of the subordination of the military to civilian rule.⁷⁴ George Washington clearly mentioned in his reply to an anonymous letter:

I cannot, in justice to my own belief, & what I have great reason to conceive is the intention of Congress, and conclude this address, without giving it as my decided opinion; that that honorable body, entertain exalted sentiments of the services of the army; — and, from a full conviction of its merits & sufferings, will do it complete justice: — That their endeavors, to discover & establish funds for this purpose, have been unwearied, and will not cease, till they have succeeded, I have succeeded, I have not a doubt. But, like all other large bodies, where there is a variety of different interests to reconcile, their deliberations are slow. ? Why then should we distrust them? — and, in consequence of that distrust, adopt measures, which may cast a shade over that glory which, has been so justly acquired; and tarnish the reputation of an army which is celebrated thro' all Europe, for its fortitude and patriotism? — and for what is this done? — to bring the object we seek for nearer? — No! — most certainly, in my opinion, it will cast it at a greater distance.⁷⁵

George Washington was a person whose characteristics were based on the principle that “A civilian who taken up arms, he had no stomach for a mutiny—or

⁷⁴ Jones, *George Washington: Ordinary Man, Extraordinary Leader*, 84-86.

⁷⁵ David Ramsay, quoted in “The Newburgh Address (Text Version),” Archiving Early America, <http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/newburgh/text.html> (accessed on August 1, 2011).

even the appearance of such—against civilian authority.”⁷⁶ This attitude contributed to the foundation of the U.S. military at an early stage and continued to influence how people think and perceive of military as a profession. In FM 1, one of the Army’s two capstone manuals, the role of General Washington is described as:

George Washington took a strong stand against the conspirators and quelled what could have become a military rebellion. His actions stand as an example of the selfless service and willing subordination to civilian authority the Nation expects of American military professionals today.⁷⁷

Samuel Huntington explained how the U.S. established successful civilian control over the military in his seminal book *The Soldier and the State*. In that book, he said that “The one prime essential for any civilian control is the minimizing of military power”⁷⁸ and that there were two types of civilian control: subjective and objective. Subjective civilian control was defined as maximizing civilian power, while objective civilian control involved maximizing military professionalism in order to reduce the political power of the military. Although the consensus that the military should be subordinated to civilian political authority was suggested by George Washington’s strong will, there was no concrete institution of how it worked until the end of the Civil War. It took time for the new republic to set up civil-military relations.

The tenet of U.S. military professionalism based on Huntington’s argument is that the military stays away from politics and civil society by only focusing on security concerns of how to protect, preserve, and train armed forces. Specifically,

⁷⁶ John E. Ferling, *The First of Men: A Life of George Washington* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 312.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-5.

⁷⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957 [1995]), 84.

military professionalism means independence from politics. Being involved in politics has been regarded by military officers as unprofessional behavior. Over time the objective civilian control over the military was set up through military professionalism in the U.S.

These are the outcomes resulting from civilian control and professionalism in the U.S. military. These principles represent that the U.S. military professionalism is well matched with de Jomini's theory in a military operational perspective and is heavily influenced in a political perspective by von Clausewitz's contention that the military should be a tool of politics. It seems obvious that the U.S. military is more influenced by de Jomini than by von Clausewitz. De Jomini's theory which encouraged the creation of a U.S. military force arranged around a large military that is engaged for conventional warfare and that is focused upon the annihilation of a conventional enemy's troops.

Robert M. Cassidy argues that "it is important to emphasize from which European military-strategic thinkers the American military tradition stemmed-more so from Napoleon and de Jomini than from von Clausewitz."⁷⁹ One of the reasons why the U.S. military preferred de Jomini's theory to von Clausewitz's was that it was easier to train soldiers by applying de Jomini's clearer and scientific principles. Michael Howard suggested that "Military academies teaching the complicated craft of war would find von Clausewitz a bewildering guide for busy young officers; but Jomini's *Precis* provided a ready-made outline for the staff-courses with which the development of nineteenth-century warfare was making increasingly necessary for the armies of Europe and North America."⁸⁰ John Nagl said that "soldiers and most

⁷⁹ Cassidy, *COIN and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War*, 104.

⁸⁰ Howard, *Studies in War and Peace*, 31.

statesmen are uncomfortable with ambiguity, with Clausewitzian ‘it depends’ on the answers. They like checklists of simple principles that always apply ideas such as ‘Annihilate the enemy’s forces in the field and you will win the war.’”⁸¹ The Conservatives were deeply affected by Jominian military theory that focused on how to annihilate enemy troops, bringing up superior forces to a certain point at a certain point in time, building up the front line, and keeping open a line of communication and combat support.

Like the Conservatives, the Crusaders had been trained to accept the primacy of traditional warfare. However, they stopped accepting this approach after they had experienced repeated defeats. Lessons learned from the Vietnam War, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan made a group of officers and scholars question the basic assumptions of conventional warfare doctrine. These conflicts raised suspicions about the utility of a traditional military that had been designed and trained to fight against regular armies. The current trend of modern warfare has required an adjustment in strategy. Rupert Smith analyzes this successfully by suggesting that:

- The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided.
- We fight amongst the people, not on the battlefield.
- Our conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending.
- We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain the objective.
- On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which are products of industrial war.
- The sides are mostly non-states, comprising some form of multi-

⁸¹ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 18.

national grouping against some non-state party or parties.⁸²

Because of reversals in Viet Nam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the Crusaders have tried to revolutionize American military doctrine. The new enemy that the U.S. is fighting is a non-state actor that employs guerrilla warfare and is trying to obtain the support of the people. Under these conditions, insurgency became the preferred strategy. As Sun Tzu suggested two thousand years ago, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”⁸³

This kind of guerrilla warfare is not new. In 1808, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Spain and replaced Spanish Prince Ferdinand with his brother Joseph Bonaparte who was more interested in wine, art, opera and the luxurious lifestyle of a monarch than in governing and fighting battles.⁸⁴ The Spanish people started to resist French occupation as Rupert Smith elaborated:

small, mobile and flexible combat groups drawn from, concealed and sustained by the people, intended to harass an enemy force superior in strength whilst avoiding any large scale direct confrontation. The political purpose of pursuing such a war was to maintain the people’s independent identity, even though occupied, by sustaining their will to continue to fight and resist. ... Because of their mobility, the dispersal of their forces into small groups and their ability to disappear among the civilian population, guerrillas are extremely difficult to pin down and bring to

⁸² Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 271.

⁸³ Shawn Connors, *The Art of War by Sun Tzu* (El Paso Norte Press, 2009), 10.

⁸⁴ Joseph Lawrence Aguiar, “The Other War: From Conventional Warfare to Counterinsurgency,” Master’s thesis (State University of New York at Binghamton, 2011), 50.

battle: guerrilla wars evolve without a fixed front line.⁸⁵

French troops became mired in this new kind of warfare in Spain, and Napoleon Bonaparte was unable to concentrate his available armies to confront the enemy as in his other campaigns in Europe. The word “guerrilla” originated from a Spanish term for a small war, which described the way the Spanish resisted the French. The Spanish took advantage of rough terrain, stealth, and the agility of small groups of soldiers to cut the lines of supply and communications of Napoleon’s troops.⁸⁶

Mao Tse-Tung later elaborated upon these concepts of guerrilla warfare. He defined guerrilla warfare as a subset of regular conventional military operations that should eventually lead to victory. For Mao, irregular warfare is protracted, needing several stages to survive, namely Phase I (organization, consolidation, and preservation), Phase II (progressive expansion), and Phase III (decision, or destruction of the enemy).⁸⁷ In this protracted war there are no clear fronts for combat, no existence of large size troops, no apparent lines of communication, and no combat support. The strategy and tactics that Mao used for fighting against the Japanese and Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalists were based on a Sixteen-Character Jingle:

1. When the enemy advances, we retreat! (敵進我退)
2. When the enemy halts, we harass! (敵駐我攪)
3. When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack! (敵避我打)
4. When the enemy retreats, we pursue! (敵退我追)⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Smith, *The Utility of Force.*, 158-159.

⁸⁶ Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 15-16.

⁸⁷ Samuel B. Griffith II, *Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla Warfare* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1961[2000]), 20-21.

⁸⁸ Samuel B. Griffith II, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971),

These are very similar to what Sun Tzu argues in *The Art of War* that “[I]f they are strong, avoid them. If they are angry, perturb them. ... If they are rested, force them to exert themselves. If they are united, cause them to be separated. Attack where they are unprepared. Go forth where they will not expect it. These are the ways military strategists are victorious.”⁸⁹ In a similar vein, Robert Smith mentions that “his advice in *The Art of War* ‘to avoid strength and strike weakness’ should be the guiding idea of the guerrilla or partisan tactician, ...”⁹⁰

The key factor in this kind of warfare, Mao suggests, is a political objective that must involve obtaining the people’s sympathy, cooperation, and assistance. He said that “Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation.”⁹¹ The emphasis on the people allowed a small number of guerrilla fighters to survive during the 6,000 miles ‘Long March’ that allowed them to escape Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist attacks. For the guerrilla, politics and warfare cannot be separated. The rules and remarks that Mao and The Eighth Route Army put emphasis on represents the importance he places on the people:

Rules:

1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks:

1. Replace the door when you leave the house.
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.

51.

⁸⁹ Ralph D. Sawyer, *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 158, and Ralph D. Sawyer, *SUN TZU: Art of War* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 168.

⁹⁰ Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 161.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 43-44.

3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.⁹²

These rules and remarks were strictly observed. Mao's guerrilla strategy involved indirect warfare that was closely related to the people and was influenced by Sun Tzu's theories.

This rather novel form of warfare was developed by General Vo Nguyen Giap who wrote *People's War People's Army*, in which he suggested that "Political work still bears upon the correct fulfillment in the army of the programmes of the Party and Government, and the setting up of good relations with the population and between officers and men."⁹³ This way of thinking seems to be similar to von Clausewitz's famous argument that war is a continuation of politics by other means. However, there is a fundamental difference between these two theorists. In guerrilla and revolutionary warfare, the people's support is both the means and the ends of a struggle, while in von Clausewitz's theory the military is only a tool and the means to an end. Giap mentions that "Political work is, ...; furthermore, the organizational work of the Party in the army. We have always given particular attention to the strengthening of organizations of the Party in the units."⁹⁴

Giap agrees with Mao that guerrilla or non-conventional strategy eventually precedes conventional warfare. The last stage for insurgents, according to Mao and

⁹² Griffith II, *Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla Warfare*, 92.

⁹³ Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War People's Army* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1961[2001]), 55.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

Giap, involves eventually engaging in conventional warfare against government forces. When insurgents are not strong enough to confront the regular army, they usually hide behind the population to preserve their strength and wait for a decisive moment. During this process, the population is not only a basis from which insurgents get support but the population also provides recruits, information, finances, et cetera. At the decisive moment, de Jomini's theory will be useful and war-fighting may be continued as conventional warfare. However, before reaching the decisive moment, circumstances on a battlefield and the surrounding political situation may change constantly, which requires insurgents to be flexible and malleable to changing conditions.

Avoiding an engagement for the purpose of preserving forces is essential in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. He says that "If you are equal in strength to the enemy, you can engage him. If you are fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you can avoid him. Thus a small enemy that acts inflexibly will become the captives of a large enemy."⁹⁵ For theorists of insurgency and insurgents, de Jomini's linear conventional strategy and Sun Tzu's irregular strategy are complementary. This approach was substantiated by the Viet Cong's strategy during the Viet Nam war, wherein the people's army adopted Sun Tzu's approach involving irregular tactics and won eventually through conventional warfare.

In order to counter the adaptive and malleable insurgent, COIN supporters introduced the notion of population centric warfare that has prioritized providing security to the population. A military force that determines its strategy and tactics from a de Jominian perspective cannot deal with this kind of enemy because there is no place to draw a front line to try to eliminate the enemy. The center of gravity in

⁹⁵ Ralph D. Sawyer, *SUN TZU: Art of War* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 178.

COIN involves offering better security to ordinary people, who may not be interested in the conflict itself, and are suffering from being threatened by other warring sides. Counterinsurgents focus on winning the hearts and minds of the people as an indirect approach rather than searching and killing insurgents.

Offering social infrastructure by building schools, paving roads, constructing irrigation systems, and hospitals may be successful in creating trust with the people so that the people may stop supporting the insurgents. Supporters of COIN such as the Crusaders insist that warfare involves important non-kinetic aspects such as building relationships with local communities that will build favorable conditions.

In contrast to Conservatives who are oriented toward de Jomini's theory of warfare that the center of gravity involves the destruction of the enemy's army at a critical point, the Crusaders assert that protecting the population is the center of gravity of operations. This does not mean that COIN supporters disregard the importance of destroying the enemy's army. Instead what is emphasized by Crusaders is that when the U.S. army kills the wrong people, this creates additional insurgents, which makes the success of military operations more difficult.

Keeping the population preserved is a unique COIN operation that has origins in Sun Tzu's view of warfare. In Chapter III of his seminal book *The Art of War*, he argued that

In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the [enemy's] state capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best. Preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best ... For this reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy

without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.⁹⁶

The concept of preservation on which Sun Tzu places the highest priority in offensive operations is “defeating the enemy before the war even breaks out and preferably by non-violent means.”⁹⁷ The destruction of enemy forces that is usually thought to be a primary goal of a military operation is secondary and even not a recommendable option for Sun Tzu. Therefore, making the enemy’s strategy insignificant through an indirect method or diplomacy that cuts alliances should be the top priority in warfare. When these efforts fail, the option of physical attack should be considered.

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people’s armies without engaging in battle, captures other people’s fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys other people’s states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of ‘preservation.’⁹⁸

This is significantly different from what de Jomini and von Clausewitz asserted. De Jomini puts the destruction of the enemy force as the main goal of offensive operations; in the same vein, “Clausewitz puts an attack on the enemy’s alliances third in his list of suitable targets for defeating the enemy.”⁹⁹ The American military that has been trained and prepared by de Jomini’s theory of scientific principles of war and von Clausewitz’s political approach is very static and frequently incapable of responding to the dynamic warfare that is conducted by irregular insurgents and

⁹⁶ Sawyer, *SUN TZU: Art of War*, 177.

⁹⁷ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1992), 46.

⁹⁸ Ralph D. Sawyer, *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* (Boulder: Western Press, 1993), 161.

⁹⁹ Handel, *Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini* , 45.

guerrillas. The U.S. military has been playing American football in which the areas of each team can be clearly recognized while the enemy is playing soccer in which any area can be used by any team.

Insurgents are fish swimming in the water of the population. The U.S. military wants to catch and kill the fish, but catching a big one is not easy and does not prevent other fish from growing. What COIN supporters are trying to do in this effort is that they are changing the nature of the water from fresh to salted. Counterinsurgents can catch or kill fish gradually, while changing the water exposes a fish that cannot stand the change and will be easily recognized. The most important allies for the insurgents are the population. Consequently, based on Sun Tzu's theory, the best way to get the insurgents is to attack the strategy of insurgents, in order to cut them off from having a supportive relationship with the population. The claim that it was possible to win wars without being engaged in fighting and using force as a last resort is influenced by "Confucian idealism and the political culture which it spawned."¹⁰⁰

To summarize the philosophical origins of these two groups, Conservatives want to retain the U.S. military's traditions that were influenced by de Jomini's ideas that victory could be obtained through the annihilation of enemy forces. This orientation towards de Jomini's ideas has led most military leaders to prefer conventional warfare focusing upon defeating the enemy in a decisive battle and to resist participating in protracted unconventional warfare that will involve the

¹⁰⁰ Based on the Michael I. Handel's comparative analysis of three military theorists (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini), Confucius taught that "For the emperor to resort to violence was an admission that he had failed in his own conduct as a sage pursuing the art of government. The resort to warfare was an admission of bankruptcy in the pursuit of the arts of peace. Consequently it should be a last resort, and it required justification both at the time and in the record." Handel, *Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini*, 76.

investment of considerable resources.

The Crusaders' approach parallels Sun Tzu's views that it is possible to win wars by being sensitive to the development of favorable social circumstances that will lead to success in counterinsurgency. The success of Mao's troops in China and the Viet Nam People's Army ascribes to Sun Tzu's guerrilla theory. In order for the U.S. to prevail over this kind of nonconventional enemy, Sun Tzu also hints at the way to deal with them. Building support with communities is more important than kinetic warfare, therefore winning without engagement is the best way of waging war. Applying this theory to non-conventional warfare, the main target of the insurgent's strategy is the population. Protecting people is the best and the shortest way to reduce the power of insurgents. Sun Tzu's perspectives inform the theory of insurgency and COIN thought while de Jomini's views inform the theory of conventional warfare thought.

Perspectives on Warfare

The difference in philosophical origins enables Crusaders and Conservatives to have divergent perspectives on warfare. Since traditional warfare supporters, by definition, do not agree with the argument that there should be a fundamental change in the way of warfare, it is better to start with the Crusaders' assertion.

As a Commander of U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth in 2006, General Petraeus participated in and oversaw the publication of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* in which he discreetly inserted this paragraph that "Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of Vietnam War over 30

years ago. *This manual is designed to reverse that trend (italics added).*”¹⁰¹ The Counterinsurgency Field Manual was a direct challenge to pre-existing U.S. military doctrine that emphasized conventional warfare.

This new orientation towards warfare was well theorized by General Rupert Smith of the United Kingdom who served in several military operations from the Gulf War, to Bosnia, Kosovo and to Northern Ireland. In his book, *The Utility of Force*, he argued that twenty-first century warfare had shifted into a new paradigm involving “War amongst the People,” and moving away from interstate industrial war, which he defined as conventional warfare.¹⁰² Smith pointed out that the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 profoundly shifted the discussion of military doctrine to conventional warfare analysis.¹⁰³ After the invention and development of nuclear weapons, although two superpowers had competed against each other during the arms race, the consensus was that nuclear war would be cataclysmic and should be avoided, making the possibility of an industrial war much less likely. Eventually, the demise of the Soviet Union during the 1990s opened a new era that led to war “in which the people in the streets and houses and fields,-all the people, anywhere-are the battle field.”¹⁰⁴

In the same vein, the importance of civilian populations in warfare was emphasized by French strategist David Galula. In his classic book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Galula described the limitations of conventional war¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ The U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), Xlvii.

¹⁰² Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 4-5.

¹⁰³ This perspective is also supported by Frank G. Hoffman. See more in his article, “Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Nontraditional Wars,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (December 2005): 913-940.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁰⁵ Galula mentions that “the strongest camp usually wins, if the contending camps are equally

when they were applied in revolutionary war situations by arguing that the strategy of conventional warfare focused on the conquest of the enemy's territory and the destruction of his forces. Galula said that in guerrilla warfare, the enemy held no territory and refused to fight for it. This situation was well expressed by metaphor that "In a fight between a fly and a lion, the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly."¹⁰⁶ Conventional warfare is distinct from counterinsurgency; victory in COIN involved "the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population."¹⁰⁷ This process is long compared to the swift victory in the first Gulf War.

Gorka and Kilcullen support the assertion regarding the changing nature of warfare with statistical data. They claim that three hundred and five out of four hundred and four conflicts since 1815 were conflicts between state and non-state actors.¹⁰⁸ In the future the U.S. military will more likely be engaged with non-state actors rather than state opponents. This perspective regarding the new era of warfare, in which the non-state actor plays a key role in conflict and in which the people are the center of gravity is not only historically based but also future oriented. Petraeus emphasizes that "America's overwhelming conventional military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will confront us head on. Rather, they will attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strengths-firepower, maneuver, technology-and come at

strong, the more resolute wins, if resolution is equally strong, then victory belongs to the camp that seizes and keeps the initiative, in addition to these, surprise may play a decisive role." David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 1964[2006]), 50.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., xii.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 54.

¹⁰⁸ Sebastian L.V. Gorka and David Kilcullen, "An Actor-Centric Theory of War," *Joint Force Quarterly*(Issue 60, 1st quarter 2011): 17.

us and our partners the way the insurgents do in Iraq and Afghanistan.”¹⁰⁹

Gian Gentile, however, takes a different view. Gentile as a key proponent of the Conservatives has raised several questions about COIN doctrine and its consequences. The COIN supporters predict that small wars will be prevalent in the future; Gentile counters this assertion by arguing that, historically, predicting future wars has been prone to error. He cites as examples Josef Stalin’s prediction that mechanized warfare was not the wave of the future, the British assessment between World I and II that the future of war would be policing the empire rather than engaging in major battles, and the recent Israeli Army’s tactical and strategic errors in south Lebanon in 2006, which was caused by over reliance on COIN operations.¹¹⁰ Gentile believes that an emphasis upon COIN based upon lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns will not be useful in future. Though he accepts the possibility of small wars in the future, he believes there is still a strong chance of a war between states with conventional forces, especially with China, India, or Russia. Therefore, the capability to wage and sustain conventional wars should be supported.

Gentile also expresses strong suspicion about the reasons for the success of ‘the surge.’ He believes that the decrease in the level of violence after the augmentation of five brigades in 2007 was not the causal factor. He argues that favorable conditions started to emerge in 2005/2006—before the surge—when the Army and the Marines successfully conducted conventional operations with civil affairs operations. At an interview on the Council on Foreign Relations, Gentile mentioned:

¹⁰⁹ David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” *Military Review* (January-February, 2006): 2.

¹¹⁰ Gian P. Gentile, “Think Again: Counterinsurgency,” *Foreign Policy* (January 13, 2009).

It was a number of other conditions that came together: the Anbar Awakening that began in Anbar Province with Marines and then built on by the Army with Sean MacFarland's brigade (USAToday) in 2005/2006, spreading into Baghdad; the co-opting of our former Sunni insurgent enemies, who allied with us to fight against al-Qaeda. All that combined with the fact that Baghdad becomes sectarian-separated in 2005/2006 as a result of the civil war, and with the Shitte militia's decision to stop attacking civilians and government forces--those came together, which produced ultimately the lowering of violence, what gives General Petraeus credibility is the impression that his policy worked in Iraq.¹¹¹

Furthermore, Gentile provides his own assessment of the surge by arguing that it succeeded not because of the execution of new COIN doctrine but because of "a cash-for-cooperation policy that put nearly 100,000 Sunnis, many of them former insurgents ... on the U.S. government payroll."¹¹² Based on his personal experience in Iraq campaign, Gentile strongly argues:

Even during my 2006 tour under General Casey, however, I was never prodded to modify the counterinsurgency operations for which my battalion had trained and which it was executing around the clock in west Baghdad; nor were the units operating alongside mine similarly dissuaded. On the contrary, by providing a baseline of security in our sector, we were assured and encouraged that our COIN operations furthered the goal of transferring authority to the Iraqi Security Forces. The counterargument-that American forces had settled so comfortably on forward operating bases that they all but quit the country around them-is flatly and directly contradicted by the operational record. My Squadron, 8-10 Calvary, Fourth Infantry Division, conducted close to 3,500 combat

¹¹¹ Bernard Gwertzman, "Conflicting Objectives for U.S. in Afghanistan," Council on Foreign Relations, 17 August 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/conflicting-objectives-us-afghanistan/p22808> (accessed on January 21, 2011).

¹¹² Bacevich, "The Petraeus Doctrine."

controls and operations during our year in Baghdad.¹¹³

This statement implies that troops trained in the traditional way were able to implement COIN warfare without necessarily being equipped with the new COIN doctrine. In addition, COIN takes a long time, even several decades. Gentile argues that this long war contradicts what the political leadership wants the military to do. COIN needs the support of all level of societies both from the U.S. and also from the host state, where American troops are deployed. History, however, reveals to us that protracted warfare has been difficult to sustain. Impatience regarding a protracted war is the main reason why President Obama declared a timeline for withdrawal from Afghanistan. Gentile warns that the COIN in Afghanistan may fail because it is a strategy that takes decades to be implemented.¹¹⁴ In Gentile's view, the U.S cannot achieve this goal. When the military fails in its mission, the next step will be increased interference by the civilian leadership in military affairs, which the U.S. military leadership dislikes.

As for perspectives regarding warfare, the Crusaders have the strong conviction that warfare has changed and this new kind of warfare involves fighting against non-state actors. They accept that this will be a "Long War." Therefore, the U.S. military should adopt a doctrine based on the new era of counterinsurgency.

¹¹³ Gian P. Gentile, "A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects," *World Affairs: A Journal of Ideas and Debate*, Summer 2008, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Summer/full-Gentile.html> (accessed on August 30, 2010).

¹¹⁴ Michael Crowley, "COIN Toss: The Cult of Counterinsurgency," *The New Republic*, January 4, 2010, <http://www.tnr.com/article/world/coin-toss> (accessed on December 10, 2010), for Gentile's concerns, see Gian Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army," *Parameters* (Autumn, 2009), and Bernard Gwertzman, "Conflicting Objectives for U.S. in Afghanistan," *Council on Foreign Relations*, August 17, 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/conflicting-objectives-us-afghanistan/p22808> (accessed on January 21, 2011).

However, Conservatives do not wholeheartedly support this change in military doctrine, arguing that conventional war fighters can adapt to COIN and that potential conventional state challengers-such as China-should not be overlooked.

The Resources Needed to Wage War

Based on the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide in 2009, the best practice in COIN “[I]ntegrates, and synchronizes political, security, economic, and informational components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing insurgent influence over the population.”¹¹⁵ This is frequently called nation-building. In order for this doctrine to be successful, the U.S. government developed a comprehensive approach to COIN that emphasized a unity of effort across all governmental branches.¹¹⁶ The nine governmental agencies that participated in this document were the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Transportation, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Achieving cooperation across these agencies is not an easy task.

From a military perspective, COIN does not require strategic weapons such as nuclear bombs, long range bombers and missiles, and aircraft carriers. Rather, it needs light infantry soldiers, who understand the local culture and are capable of building a community of trust by offering local people a social infrastructure including the security which can be provided through policing activities, which in turn will begin to dissolve their loyalty to the insurgents. It does not need tanks and heavy artillery. In order for soldiers to function in this environment, training for such missions is more

¹¹⁵ U.S. Government Interagency COIN Initiative, *U.S. Government COIN Guide* (January, 2009), 12.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*,

important than acquiring combat skills. In terms of troop size, it needs many small units rather than large units. A small unit is more advantageous because it can move quickly and adapt to a mobile enemy.¹¹⁷ Under this approach building trust with the people is essential.

On the other hand, conservatives downgrade the COIN doctrine as being one of many tactics rather than considering it as a different strategy. Gentile argues that COIN operations are about tactics rather than strategy.¹¹⁸ In terms of the Afghanistan campaign, Gentile cited that “the president’s objectives are to disable, disrupt, and dismantle al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and to prevent it from using Afghanistan and Pakistan as a base from which to attack the United States.” As a policy it is very clear and determined. Gentile asks: why the U.S. military has to implement such “a maximalist approach of nation-building to achieve those rather limited objectives?”¹¹⁹ The question that the U.S military needs to answer now is not how to fight but what to fight. The absence of a link between tactical performance and a national strategy makes it more likely for the American armed forces to repeat the same past mistakes.

The other objection that this group makes is that American power is limited in its effort to transform entire societies. Being engaged in this kind of war throughout the world, and consuming national resources in acquiring an unachievable goal is exactly what potential enemies want the U.S. to do.¹²⁰ Therefore, Conservatives oppose the reallocation of resources that favor light infantry troops because they argue

¹¹⁷ John Arquilla, “The New Rules of War,” *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/the_new_rules_of_war (accessed on June 11, 2010).

¹¹⁸ Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army.” *Parameters* (Autumn, 2009): 7.

¹¹⁹ Gwertzman, “Conflicting Objectives for U.S. in Afghanistan,” 3.

¹²⁰ Shawn Brimley, “Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives,” *Small War Journal*, October 18, 2008, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/113-brimley.pdf> (accessed on May 11, 2009).

that traditional troops are already quite capable of implementing COIN efforts. The new balance tilted toward COIN warfare may deplete resources dedicated to building troops for the next big fight against potential state challengers, such as China. A comparison of these two doctrines is summarized in Table 3.1.

	Conventional Warfare	Counterinsurgency
Philosophical Origins	De Jomini's annihilation and von Clausewitz's Political Tool Theories	Sun-Tzu's Conservation Theory
Perspectives on Warfare	Fighting and Killing Enemies (Enemy Oriented Warfare)	Winning Hearts and Minds of People (Population Oriented Warfare)
Resources to Wage War	Large and Kinetic Troops with Strategic Forces	Small and Non-Kinetic Soldiers Equipped with Fighting and Civil Affairs Skills

<Table 3.1: Comparison of Two Doctrines>

Implications and Lessons

The differences between these two doctrines dictate what kinds of troops are needed for prospective warfare. As summarized in Table 3.1, under the COIN doctrine, the fighters should be able to understand the local people and be ready to help them but also be willing to kill the enemy when it is necessary. This kind of task is mainly executed by light infantry soldiers or special operations forces. Since the people are the targets and sources of operations, counterinsurgent soldiers need to be culturally adept, in order to enhance the possibility of military success. Therefore, the size of the light infantry is expected to get bigger compared to other services, such as Armor.

The second thing that should be regarded as important is the reason why the

U.S. military has been reluctant to take irregular warfare seriously into account. The main reason as discussed in the preceding arguments arose from the Jominian emphasis upon the use of conventional troops in decisive battles. The culture of the U.S. armed forces was strongly influenced by the Jominian principles of mass movement and annihilation of enemy. This requires not only a big army to defend itself but also a large conventional enemy to fight. This philosophical orientation is reinforced by a culture of military professionalism in the U.S. that subordinates the military to civilian rule. One of the important institutions of democracy is a military force that is controlled by a civilian leader who is elected by the people. The U.S. established this institutional framework very early in its history of the republic by isolating professional soldiers from politics.

The third point is the most important lesson from this debate: that is to understand the change in warfare in general. During the Cold War, military strategy focused on conventional forces and the possible deployment of nuclear weapons. Because of U.S. capabilities in these two areas, opponents of the U.S. shifted to small wars. After the demise of the Soviet Union and the U.S. military's success during the Gulf War, most U.S. opponents realized the supremacy enjoyed by the U.S. in the use of conventional force, and its opponents changed to irregular warfare to exploit the U.S.'s vulnerabilities.¹²¹ The era of persistent irregular warfare has emerged and in this kind of warfare the center of gravity has shifted from the use of kinetic forces to the use of new skills to win the hearts and minds of the people.

To support this argument, I suggest a fundamental reason why the U.S. actually accepted the irregular warfare doctrine in the middle of the Operation Iraqi Freedom. It originated from American foreign policy, which encouraged the spread of

¹²¹ Smith, *The Utility of Force*.

democracy under the Bush Administration. Accepting irregular warfare through the COIN doctrine combined the goals of both the political aim of extending democracy and warfare into one objective. Therefore, the new COIN doctrine more explicitly advances the democratization project than did the pre-existing Cold War conventional military doctrine. I would describe COIN operations and strategies as “Democratic Warfare” that uses the military to encourage democracies. *The National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, recently published by The White House, states that, “Our approach to political change in the Middle East and North Africa illustrates that promoting representative and accountable governance is a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy and directly contributes to our CT (Counterterrorism) goals.”¹²²

In this new kind of warfare in which terrorists, insurgents, or guerrillas are the enemy the U.S. military fights, the government chooses the starting point of a war, but the end point of the war is not under the control of the U.S.’ military or civilian leaders but rather by the people in the states where the war takes place.

¹²² The White House, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (Washington D.C, June 2011), p. 5. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/06/29/national-strategy-counterterrorism> (accessed on July 4, 2011)

Chapter IV

The Role of Military Leadership in Military Doctrinal Change

*One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious
One whose generals are capable and not interfered with by the ruler will be
victorious*
Sun Tzu, Planning Offensive in *The Art of War*

Introduction

The proposition that doctrinal change is impeded by the military's intrinsic conservatism is generally accepted.¹²³ Sarkesian, Williams and Bryant suggest military conservatism as one of the commonalities drawn from scholarly views about the U.S. military by saying that "[I]t is a basically conservative system operating within a democratic system; the notion of duty, honor, and country is a core component; and the primary purpose of the profession is success in combat; ..."¹²⁴ The U.S. military's response to the failure of Vietnam involved not institutionalizing COIN doctrine even though COIN began obtaining success at the end of the war.¹²⁵ Instead the U.S. military

¹²³ David H. Ucko describes this as 'inertia' in the conservative military in his book, *The New Counterinsurgency Era*, and Robert M. Cassidy calls it a 'European-style conventional war' in *COIN and the Global War on Terror*.

¹²⁴ The authors also quote that "The dilemma faced by the military profession is ... that in the United States the conservative military profession operates within a liberal society," Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Fred B Bryant, *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*, 13-15.

¹²⁵ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 252-254.

reverted to doctrine based upon conventional warfare.¹²⁶

This trend became the predominant school of thought, the ‘Never Again School,’ which was articulated in the Weinberger Doctrine during the 1980s, and was subsequently embodied by General Colin Powell representing the following conditions to use forces, “(1) the United States should not commit troops without public support; (2) if America does commit the military, it should have clearly defined political and military objectives; (3) the United States should use force only in an overwhelming manner and with the intent of winning; (4) America should commit force only in defense of vital national interests; and (5) the United States should use military force only as a last resort.”¹²⁷ This Powell doctrine was also another expression of the conventional warfare doctrine that focused on the preparation of mass military for state challengers. This can be attributed to the fact that there was no significant change in U.S. military doctrine after the Vietnam War, although the U.S. had an unexpected defeat against a small irregular enemy.¹²⁸ Defeat in the Vietnam War should have provoked a critical reevaluation of U.S. military doctrine.

Similarly, after unprecedented terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland on September 11, 2001, two consecutive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a change in the leadership in the U.S. government, and the worst economic recession since the Great Depression, one might ask, ‘should these factors have provoked a reevaluation of U.S. military doctrine?’ According to Suzanne C. Nielsen of the U.S. Army War College, military reform is an outcome of four sources of change: political, social, economic

¹²⁶ Robert M. Cassidy, *COIN and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 120.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 102.

¹²⁸ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Michigan: The University of Chicago Press, 2005).

and technological conditions.¹²⁹ What had happened during the last decade was related to these variables as well as international circumstances, but there is no clear explanation of how these conditions are intertwined to produce a change in military doctrine.

Although there are several scholarly arguments that political, social, economic, and international factors play an important role in producing change, not many studies have paid attention to the role of military leadership as contrasted with the role of politicians. I will focus on the role of the military leadership for two reasons. A long tradition of military professionalism in the U.S. has resulted in the military leadership playing an important role in national security and organizational solidarity issues. While the military leadership has an obligation to follow orders provided by the civilian leadership, if these orders are not consistent with an organizational tenet that may be important to the military, it may sometimes be repudiated or attenuated by military commanders in the field.¹³⁰ This does not mean that the military leadership has more power than the civilian leadership, however, it can passively resist or impede change that is being demanded by the civilian leadership. Moreover, it does imply that the military leadership plays a critical and perhaps superior role over the civilian leadership in the ultimate determination of military doctrine.

Another explanatory variable involves the heterogeneity of the military leadership. Not all military leaders are conservative and resistant to adopting new approaches. A different background, education, and several other factors may

¹²⁹ Suzanne C. Nielsen, *An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organization* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 4.

¹³⁰ Lee Lacy, "A Timely Lesson from the Korean War," *Small Wars Journal* (November 6, 2010), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/596-lacy.pdf> (accessed on April 10, 2011).

influence the behavior of an individual leader. Any factor that reduces the degree of conservatism in the military plays a key role in producing a change in military doctrine. As an example, the civilian education of a high profile officer in the military has an effect upon changing military doctrine. In a military that is essentially conservative and isolated from a more liberal U.S. society,¹³¹ a commissioned officer who receives a civilian education may mitigate his or her orientation towards conservatism. I propose that as the number of generals with civilian educations, especially generals in the eighteen positions most involved with policy making, has increased, there has been a shift in military doctrine from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency.

This chapter comprises three parts. I will start with a review of the literature related to the change in the military. In the second part, a military leadership theory and a possible mechanism for change will be illustrated. The implications and conclusion will follow.

Who Institutes a Change in the Military?

Although the military is regarded as a conservative bureaucratic organization that is resistant to change, changes do occur in the military. The literature regarding the key factors determining military change falls under one of three groups: political leadership, military leadership, or society as a whole.

Barry Posen in *The Sources of Military Doctrine* argues that the civilian leadership plays the leading role in changing the military by stating that “[C]ivilian intervention into military doctrine is likely to be the primary cause of political-

¹³¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957[1985]), 456-457.

military integration of grand strategy, simply because civilians alone have the interest and the authority to reconcile political ends with military means and set priorities among military services according to some rational calculus.”¹³² Under a system of civilian control over the military, change occurs because of the direction or permission of politicians; further, under this point of view, any change that occurs without the civilian political leadership’s direction cannot be sustained. In a similar vein, Benjamin Fordham proposes that the preference of a military force’s structure is closely related to a president’s party affiliation.¹³³ Fordham argues that Republicans tend to spend more of the military budget in building up strategic forces, while Democrats focus on general purpose forces because of their differing societal constituencies. Furthermore, he asserts that “[A]lthough Soviet gains in relative nuclear capabilities influenced Democrats’ decisions about strategic force they had little or no influence on Republican choices.”¹³⁴ Under this approach, the initiative of politicians as contrasted with military officers is more important in shaping how the military operates. Furthermore, under notions of democratic rule, this line of argument is reasonable given that military forces that are not under the control of a civilian political leadership constitute a serious threat to democracy.

Deborah Avant investigated the institutional effect on military change by engaging in a comparative analysis of the U.S. and British military. Avant makes a convincing argument that differences in institutional structures – a presidential system in the U.S. and the parliamentary system in the U.K.– produced dissimilar results in

¹³² Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 58.

¹³³ Benjamin O. Fordham, “Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending,” *The Journal of Politics* 64 no.1 (Feb., 2002): 63.

¹³⁴ The hidden meaning of this argument is that domestic actors respond differently to the same international circumstances. *Ibid.*,

these two states. A presidential system that has a divided civilian leadership tends to make change more difficult while the parliamentary system of unified civilian leadership is likely to implement change more easily.¹³⁵ Todd Sechser also found that military behavior is the consequence of civilian control by arguing that “[O]n average, states lacking strong civilian control tend to initiate armed conflicts much more frequently than states whose militaries are under tight civilian reins....the cautious nature of American military officers may be a consequence of strong civilian control and is probably not common to militaries in general.”¹³⁶ His statistical results suggest that civilian leadership plays a key role in military behavior.

The interrelationship between the civilian and military leaders is complex with civilian leaders setting policy and strategic objectives, while the military leadership has less influence over strategy and policy, and more influence concerning tactics. The relationship between these two groups is dynamic and fluid, however, with power and decision making ebbing and flowing between the two groups. What is more difficult to explain and understand is that the military leadership may indeed be interested in change but on its own terms and at its own pace.

For this reason, some scholars focus on the role of military leadership. Suzanne Nielsen argues in her monograph that military leaders were the crucial developers of reforms by examining institutional change after the Vietnam War in the 1970s and early 1980s.¹³⁷ According to Nielsen, “A general pattern is that civilian policy decisions provide the parameters within which militaries operate. The manner

¹³⁵ Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 10-11.

¹³⁶ Todd S. Sechser, “Are Soldiers Less War Prone than Statemen?” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 no. 5 (Oct. 2004), 747.

¹³⁷ Nielsen, *An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army’s Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organization*, 27.

in which military leaders respond to these constraints, as well as to factors such as a threat, is usually a product of analyses that occur within military organizations.”¹³⁸

She said that directions given by the civilian leadership to the military provide parameters and constraints concerning how the military leadership should behave. Still, the specifics of change may be determined by military officers who have to implement the change. In terms of the doctrinal choice, it is the military leadership who choose a type of doctrine by taking both the directions and circumstances into consideration.

However, this approach does not adequately explain how the military responds. And it also assumes that all military leaders respond in a uniform way. This may not necessarily be true. Each individual in the military leadership may have a different preference regarding choice of military doctrine. Heterogeneity of views within the military leadership is a factor that is relevant for analysis.

Literature that focuses on the relationship between civilian and military leaders should not be overlooked. Samuel Huntington observed the gap between a conservative military and a liberal society in the U.S. and argued that military professionalism would be threatened if this gap increased.¹³⁹ Especially, during the Cold War Era,¹⁴⁰ a strong professional military officer corps that was “immune to politics and respected for its military character, would be a steadying balance wheel in the conduct of policy.”¹⁴¹ Society as a whole plays a key role in affecting the

¹³⁸ Ibid., 34.

¹³⁹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 456-457.

¹⁴⁰ As for the Huntington’s definition of conservativeness during this era, it was “[A] stress on the limitations of man, and acceptance of institutions as they were, a critique of utopianism and “solutionism,” and a new respect for history and society as against profess and the individual.” Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 458-459.

¹⁴¹ In terms of the cause to change the liberal society to the conservative one is external

characteristics of the military because the military is a part of society. According to Huntington's perspective, the presence of an external threat such as the Soviet Union made society more conservative, which reduced the gap between the military and society. This eventually encouraged military professionalism and alleviated tensions in civil-military relations. Although it is assumed that the military will remain conservative as a constant, I will challenge that assumption via the data I have gathered and analyzed.

Morris Janowitz challenged Huntington's theory that all military officers were generally conservative. He claimed that their views were heterogeneous, being affected by political and societal circumstances.¹⁴² Janowitz argued that "Professional perspectives in the military have been divergent or pluralistic on basic politico-military matters, and this pluralism has persisted."¹⁴³ For example, he suggested two types of trends for the logic of war, namely, those embodied by absolutists and pragmatists. The absolutists are those who pursued the military goal of total victory while the pragmatists pay attention to political ends as well as the limitations of what the military can do. There were significant differences on important issues between the two groups such as the possibility of an atomic war, U.S. long-term political goals, U.S. military strategy, and so on.¹⁴⁴ In addition, Janowitz asserted that military organizations were influenced by political pressures and societal circumstances and stated "It is impossible to isolate the professional soldiers from domestic political life, and it is undesirable to leave the tasks of political education completely to the

security threat based on Huntington's theory and this will be dealt with in latter part of this chapter. Ibid., 464.

¹⁴² Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldiers: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 417-433.

¹⁴³ Ibid., xv.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 264-273. Even this difference made two conspicuous lines of high ranked officers: European oriented (pragmatists) vs. Asian Theater focused (Ibid., xxxvii-xliv).

professionals themselves, even though they have been highly responsible in this assignment.”¹⁴⁵

This argument implies that the gap between the military and civilian society becomes smaller as their interactions increase and that military organizations are not fundamentally different from civilian organizations in the sense that an internal conflict always exists within organizations. One of his points that should not be missed is the introduction of a constabulary force whose definition is worth quoting directly:

The constabulary force concept encompasses the entire range of military power and organization. At the upper end are the weapons of mass destruction; those of flexible and specialized capacity are at the lower end, including the specialists in the military aid programs, in para-military operations, in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare.¹⁴⁶

This definition is very similar to the full-spectrum operations that include COIN and which the U.S. military is trying to build.¹⁴⁷ Even in the early 1970s Janowitz proposed an alternative military doctrine for the U.S. military. Regarding the subject of change within the military, he emphasized the role of military leaders, especially those who were unconventional in their careers. The term “unconventionality” means exposure to experiences which are outside of the role of a professional soldier.¹⁴⁸ General Grant during the Civil War, John Pershing during WWI, and Dwight Eisenhower during WWII are good examples supporting his

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 439.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 418.

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Army. *FM 3-0: Operation* (2001, 2008, 2011)

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 150.

argument that successful military leaders were not conservative by nature but rather were mavericks.¹⁴⁹

Any change starts with self-criticism, which rarely comes from those who want to maintain traditions, but rather from those who challenge them. And according to Janowitz, when doctrinal change is being demanded by the civilian political leadership, it is likely to choose a Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff that is willing to implement that change.¹⁵⁰ Although Janowitz admitted that the military leadership played a critical role, in his theory civilian leadership still exercised authority over them.

Military Conservatism and Changes in the Military

Based upon the existing literature outlined above, relatively little attention has been paid to the role played by the military leadership regarding changes in doctrine. Even in several studies that analyzed the performance of the leaders in uniform, these studies still paid more attention to the civilian authority that supervised them rather than the military men themselves. These studies also assumed that military officers behave in a uniform way because they had an obligation to follow the direction provided by civilian leaders in a democracy.

However, there are several reasons to investigate the possibility that the military leadership is the main actor in affecting change concerning doctrine within the military. First, the professional culture in the military demands that the military leadership be held responsible for his or her performance. Since the military organization is relatively closed and maintaining one's personal reputation is an

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 152.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 153, 430.

important factor in a leader's career, even after taking civilian political influence into account, there is a possibility that a military leader will stick to his or her beliefs even when they may contradict the civilian leader's will. This means that when an order from the civilian leadership has a purely political purpose, a military leader may be resistant to implementing it properly. In addition, as mentioned above, the military is not homogenous in terms of how it fights and prepares for wars.

Most of the literature assumes this homogeneity in the military leadership, therefore, other domestic or international factors are supported as an explanatory variable for any military change. Once this assumption is relaxed, the role of the military is expected to be more dynamic than it used to be. One of the possible ways to measure this is to analyze the difference in the degree of conservatism or flexibility among the top leaders. This measure may deliver insight into how doctrinal heterogeneity emerges from having the senior military leadership exposed to civilian education.

My theoretical argument starts with the idea that senior military leaders who are mavericks may indeed have an impact upon the military even if it is essentially conservative. These mavericks are unconventional by nature. And these mavericks become even more flexible and imaginative in their approach to doctrine because of their exposure to a civilian education. Before the war in Iraq, existing doctrine was focused on state actors and mobilizing armor, infantry, and air forces in mass maneuvers to achieve battlefield success. After the problems encountered in Iraq, doctrinal changes accelerated. I argue that the civilian education of senior military leadership played an important role in accelerating that change.

In order to build a theory about how change occurs within a conservative military, the concept of conservatism needs to be clarified. The orientation towards


conservatism has two aspects. First, it is about a group oriented perspective. To maintain and insure discipline, as an institution, the military prioritizes group identity over individual liberty. The group's first sentiment sometimes asks individuals to sacrifice their individual liberty when there is conflict between the two.¹⁵¹ Although any organization emphasizes some degree of prioritizing the group over the individual, the military's emphasis is much stronger.

The second concept is related to its tolerance for change. The military operates based on a principle called the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to reduce uncertainty in extremely complex situations on the battlefield, therefore, new doctrines that have not been verified beforehand are hard for them to accept.¹⁵² In other words, the institution resists change. There may be two factors that may affect change in military doctrine: political pressure or military experience. I argue that civilian political pressure is less important than military experience in both success and failure in war as it affects doctrine. When examining these two factors, military leaders, who are conservative, are less likely to be motivated to change because when a consensus develops within their leadership, they are resistant to calls for a substantive change that usually comes from their civilian leaders. In the absence of an internal need, the military leadership will resist calls for change demanded by the civilian leadership. Therefore any factors that may affect the degree of military conservatism may be worth investigating, even though a transition from an established conventional doctrine to one based on COIN in the absence of both an internal need and a willingness to accept change is quite unlikely.

¹⁵¹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 24.

¹⁵² For more reasons for the military to resist the change, see Nielsen, *An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organization*, 8-9.

Because I am assuming that the military is more conservative than civilian society, I believe that the more the military interacts with and establishes a working relationship with civilian personnel the less conservative the military will eventually become. In expounding on my theory I refer to this as ‘assimilation’. Assimilation represents any activity that leads to a reduction in the priority attached to group identity. As the gap between the military and civilian society decreases, the military may be prone to adopt a less traditional doctrine. The assimilation process is a very gradual one given the strict hierarchical nature of the military. As is well known, the military is operated by commands issued from higher ranking officers to the lower ranks. The senior military leadership is responsible for strategy, tactics, and military doctrine.



<Figure 4.1: Military Conservatism and a Doctrinal Change>

In addition to the assimilation process, the existence of a need to amend current doctrine plays a role in changing military doctrine. As mentioned above, this may have two origins: military experience and political pressure. In the event the military faces a stalemate and current doctrine cannot cope with battlefield conditions,

an improvised change in doctrine is often necessary in order to achieve the stated objective. For example, when the U.S. ground forces were trying to combat the hit and run tactics of the Vietcong, any attempt to break the stalemate should have affected the doctrine in place at that time. The surge operation in 2007 in Iraq was another example of internal needs. Despite the initial kinetic success in the Iraq War, stability on the battlefield was difficult to attain. The need to adapt to the failure of kinetic warfare led to the COIN “surge”, sending more troops to implement a stabilizing operation that focused on the security of ordinary people, building social structures, and winning the hearts and minds of people.

A Civilian Education and Military Leadership

One of the ways to diminish the rigidity of the military and to reduce the gap between civilians and the military (civil-military) is to provide military officers with an external civilian education that prioritizes individual identity over group identity. This exposure to such a non-military environment should help the military to become more tolerant towards change.

There are several ways to measure the civil-military gap, which is one of the main explanatory variables for doctrinal change.¹⁵³ I use a civilian education as a proxy to measure the gap between civilians and the military. A game theory model helps to illustrate this theory, and the theory will be tested with a statistical model that calculates the percentage of military leadership with exposure to a civilian education.

¹⁵³ For the ways to measure civil-military gap, see Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver and Jason Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, *Choosing Your Battle: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), and Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

Based on a review of the literature regarding the effect of education on political attitudes by Ekehammar, Nilsson, and Sidanius, there is significant evidence that socio-political attitudes are closely related to educational direction and field of study. Vocational school students are more conservative than academic students. Likewise, students majoring in social science are found to be less conservative than those who take natural or engineering sciences.¹⁵⁴ This sociological study also accounts for how people in the military become more conservative because a military education is mainly vocational and the emphasis is closer to natural science and engineering.¹⁵⁵ In addition, according to Ekehammar, Nilsson, and Sidanius, one of the well accepted propositions is that “A long education is said to be linked to liberal attitudes ... college-educated persons are regarded as less conservative.”¹⁵⁶ In the same vein, because civilian educational institutions encourage individual rather than group identity, this result is worth paying attention to. Therefore, the availability of a civilian education for career military officers may have an attenuation effect upon their conservatism.


In addition to the effect of higher education, a civilian education gives military officers a chance to think differently about the military by taking them away from their day-to-day routine. Compared to the military, the lifestyles at universities are less strict and offer military officers a chance to hear a diversity of opinions from both their professors and social connections. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that there may be a negative correlation between obtaining a civilian education and

¹⁵⁴ Nielsen, *An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organization*, 396.

¹⁵⁵ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 222-245.

¹⁵⁶ Bo Ekehammar, Ingrid Nilsson, and Jim Sidanius, “Education and Ideology: Basic Aspects of Education Related to Adolescents’ Sociopolitical Attitudes,” *Political Psychology* 8 no.3 (September, 1987): 396.

conservatism.



<Figure 4.2: Civilian Education and a Doctrinal Change>

Still, what needs to be understood is when and how education influences the military's willingness to change regarding doctrine. The military is a hierarchical organization and encourages conformity to obtain promotion.

One study about graduate education and U.S. military professionalism of mid-level officers by Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant shows that “[F]or many officers the impact of a civilian graduate education is on long-term career considerations and intellectual mind-sets....the awareness of the academic world, the sense of acquiring knowledge, and the uniqueness of the educational experience may well remain with officers for the rest of their careers.”¹⁵⁷ This empirical research concludes that a civilian education has no effect upon an officer's inclination not to be involved in political decision making.¹⁵⁸

This is an expected result in the conservative military organization and for captains and majors in the Army. The short duration of the civilian education (from two to five years) may not be enough to produce a swift change in beliefs and

¹⁵⁷ Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Fred B. Bryant, *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*, 21.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

attitudes among mid-level commissioned officers. In the conservative military middle-level officers with civilian educations are not expected to express opinions regarding policy and doctrine that are different from established doctrine. However, this story may change when these officers reach those higher level positions (usually general and colonel) in which their opinions can be heard in a decision making process. The civilian educational experience offers a potential alternative framework within which to view the world and the military organization differently. Although the time spent obtaining a civilian education may be relatively short, I argue, and support this with data, that their exposure to this type of education affects their approach to doctrine when or if they assume the leadership position of general.

When confronted with a doctrinal choice between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency, high ranking military officers, who have been exposed to a civilian education, tend to support less conventional approaches. Their exposure to a civilian education may play a role in causing officers to question that doctrine and propose flexible alternatives.

Examining the logic of how the changes in military conservatism can influence doctrinal choice, offers several possible hypotheses that can be drawn:

H1: As more military leaders acquire a civilian education, they become more flexible in their thinking and they may be more amenable to modifications that may lead to a change of doctrine (Military Leadership Hypothesis).

H2: When the military faces obstacles that current doctrine cannot deal with, the military attempts to alter the doctrine (Military Experience Hypothesis).

H3: When the military leadership faces increased pressure from the civilian political leadership to change military doctrine, the more conservative leaders within the military will try to resist a change in doctrine (Military Independent Hypothesis).

Conclusion

Recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey delivered an address about a future national and military strategy at Duke University. This was a timely remark because President Obama issued a statement saying that the Asia-Pacific region was the key to future U.S. foreign and military policy.¹⁵⁹

In his address, there were several comments that were related to my argument. General Dempsey talked about his experience attending Duke University, where he earned his Masters' degree in English. Responding to a question regarding the role a graduate level degree in liberal arts had played in his military career, he emphasized that, "It was incredibly broadening. Everyplace I had previously gone to school, you could label as somewhat conservative and maybe dramatically conservative. When I came to Duke and I was confronted with a few points that I had never been confronted with ... It opened my mind to seek, not just accept, but seek other ways of thinking about things...I am always looking for ways to phrase something in a way that is persuasive."¹⁶⁰ He especially mentioned two consecutive failings in a French course, and recalled that "I do not know that I had ever failed anything up to that point ... I

¹⁵⁹ Political Speeches and Documents, "President Obama Addresses the Australian Parliament," History Musings, November 17, 2011 <http://historymusings.wordpress.com/2011/11/17/full-text-november-17-2011-president-barack-obama-addresses-australian-parliament-asia-pacific-tour-transcript/> (accessed on January 14, 2014).

¹⁶⁰ Martin E. Dempsey, "Military Strategy in the 21st Century," Duke University, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/303668-1> (accessed on January 15, 2014).

think it is important we give them[young men and women in uniform] the opportunity to see what failure looks like, so they come to the conclusion it is not something they can like and that with the right attitude and work, they can overcome it ... In the context of any strategy, it has got to be given time to work. We have to make sure as we step off to execute it. We know there will be mistakes. You have to underwrite that. Ultimately, we continue to grow and develop emotionally through diversity. There are plenty of opportunities out there for diversity.”¹⁶¹ This comment helps to confirm my argument that a civilian education makes a military officer less conservative and willing to accept a different perspective.

As mentioned above, he emphasized the importance of the underlying context under which such a strategy exists. The U.S. military will pay more attention to producing military officers who are capable of analyzing each situation and adapting accordingly. This implies that there is always a possibility that an original plan is not implemented as planned. When an original plan is more likely to be failing, alternatives must be sought. This contains a very important implication that there is a need for military officers who will be more flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances as a result of their exposure to a civilian education.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

Chapter V

A Game Theoretic Model for Determining Military Doctrine

Theory and Game Theoretic Model

Based on the theoretical argument that the assimilation process in the military leadership plays an important role in influencing military doctrine, I will build a game theoretical and statistical model in the following chapters, which shows how the theory works and tests the hypotheses mentioned above. I will introduce two models and explain the theory behind each one. The game theoretic model is more deterministic than the statistical model.

My theory will be represented and explained using a game theoretical expression, because it is built upon several assumptions that are needed to clarify the causal mechanism inherent in the theory. The causal mechanism can be illustrated more clearly in the game theoretic model, while the statistical model employs dissimilar theories that may impact the causal mechanism. They complement each other.¹⁶² If the theory can be explained and supported by these models, its utility will be increased. In the game theoretical model, I try to present a general picture of how the military leadership and the civilian leadership interact to affect change in military doctrine.

¹⁶² Morris P. Fiorina, "Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise," *Critical Review* Vol.9 (1995). Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Statistical Political Philosophy and Positive Political Theory," *Critical Review* Vol. 9 (1995).

A brief review of game theory is necessary to define some basic concepts employed in my model. Dixit and Susan state that “[G]ame theory is the science of rational behavior in interactive situations.”¹⁶³ Similarly, Roger Myerson says that “Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers.”¹⁶⁴ Interactive situations refer to the fact that there should be more than two actors that influence other’s decisions. One actor’s decision is dependent upon how other players think and behave. Players choose the best option that leads to their goal, while taking players’ expected actions into account.

What kind of players are there? Each player should be a rational actor. The concept of rationality is based on three assumptions. First each player has a set of goals to achieve. Second, all players have the freedom to make a choice from a multiple number of options, although not all options will be optimal. Third, individuals make choices that they believe are the best to achieve their goals.¹⁶⁵ James Morrow makes this clear by saying that “[R]ational behavior means choosing the best means to gain a predetermined set of ends. It is an evaluation of the consistency of choices and not of the thought process, of implementation of fixed goals and not of the morality of those goals.”¹⁶⁶

The next question is how to determine the most favorable outcome for an individual among several possible consequences. Here, two additional concepts should be understood regarding preference ordering. They are comparability and

¹⁶³ Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath, *Game of Strategy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 3.

¹⁶⁴ Roger B. Myerson, *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 1.

¹⁶⁵ James D. Morrow, *Game Theory for Political Scientists* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 7-8.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 17

transitivity. Comparability, also called completeness means that “[T]he alternatives are comparable if, for any pair of them, the chooser either prefers the first to the second, the second to the first, or is indifferent between them.”¹⁶⁷ The meaning of transitivity is that “[I]f Mr. *i* strictly prefers *x* to *y* and *y* to *z*, then he prefers *x* to *z*... If *i*'s preferences satisfy comparability and transitivity, then *i* is said to possess a *preference ordering (italic original)*.”¹⁶⁸ Comparability and transitivity, also called preference ordering are conditions that help players make rational decisions when faced with a number of alternatives. This preference ordering is usually expressed as a payoff on a numeric scale or a utility function. The payoff or utility function represents how important each player rates each outcome.

Equipped with preference ordering, each player participates in a game and is faced with a number of possible options. At each information-set, that is the point where the player has a certain type of information, they need to make a decision. The sequence of choices comprises a strategy that eventually leads each player to a final goal or outcome. When players choose an option, they take into account what the other player chooses. This is strategic thinking. The strategic choice may vary depending on whether all players choose simultaneously or not. It is called a perfect information game when all players must make a decision at the same time, while in an imperfect information game the latter players can see the choices of the former.

Each player eventually reaches a certain end point, which does not change without some external influence. This is called equilibrium, which means that “each player is using the strategy that is the best response to the strategies of the other

¹⁶⁷ Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek, *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 26.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 26.

players.”¹⁶⁹ This does not necessarily mean that all players will end up with their best result. Instead, equilibrium in game theory implies that there is a possibility that each player may not obtain the best outcome, due to the consideration of the other player’s choice. The best example is the prisoners’ dilemma game, in which both players reach an equilibrium worse than their best outcomes. Finding equilibrium which is represented by the strategy of each player is how a game theory model explains a theory.

A game theoretic model sometimes needs to explain a theory with probabilistic situations in order to cope with uncertain circumstances that are important for players to make a decision. For example, when the civilian leadership needs to decide whether or not the U.S. should send military troops to intervene in a conflict, the possibility of success is very important. However this is very hard to know in advance. In this situation, a probabilistic consideration can be introduced by a Nature move that determines the nature of the world arbitrarily with a success probability of p . With the help of a Nature move, game theory can expand the horizon of a theory from a certain to an uncertain world. In the probabilistic world, the numeric payoff or utility function is replaced by the expected payoff or expected utility, that is the product of probability times the payoff, or the utility function.

Conservative Military Leadership and Doctrinal Change

By applying a game theoretic approach to the role of military leadership to affect doctrinal change in the U.S. military, I will introduce two game theoretic models, one of which represents the role of a conservative military leadership and the other less conservative role. These two models are identical except for the characteristic of

¹⁶⁹ Dixit and Skeath, *Game of Strategy*, 30.


military leadership, which are either strictly conservative or less conservative. Each game is composed of two main actors; a civilian leadership and a military leadership. The actors are considering the introduction of a new military doctrine that may be helpful to overcome a current problem or to prepare for an expected challenge that the existing doctrine may not handle. The U.S. military has traditionally employed a mass-maneuver-state-centered conventional doctrine, but is now considering a change to a COIN doctrine. The basic assumption is that the probability of success by employing a COIN doctrine in an irregular war is greater than one with conventional warfare. The situation under which this game begins is that the U.S. is currently struggling while fighting an irregular war, or the U.S. is at least expecting to face an unconventional adversary in the future. The main purpose of introducing these two games is to show that there is an equilibrium change affected by the characteristics of the military leadership.

I start with the model of a conservative military leadership. The initial mover is the civilian leadership (CL), who either recommends that the military institute a change in operation (S) or does nothing (\sim S). Since the default doctrine is conventional, this recommendation for change means that the COIN doctrine should be adopted. If this recommendation is implemented, the civilian leadership will achieve loyalty (L) with the military. If the doctrine is not adopted, loyalty will be lost. As for the ultimate benefit, the success of the suggested doctrine will bring them a winning payoff (W), while failure will demand a political cost (PC) such as the loss of an election. This winning payoff will be achieved by the civilian leadership regardless of the type of doctrine adopted. However, when compared to a conventional doctrine, COIN which engages in irregular warfare is more difficult to win in a democratic world, so the civilian leadership will achieve extra credit called winning with

legitimacy (WL). When the agreed upon military doctrine is counterinsurgency, the political leadership will have to endure the costs of a long war, since the operations to win the hearts and minds of the people may take a long time to achieve (LC).

The military leadership (ML) can respond to the recommendations of the civilian leadership or propose its own initiative under the no suggestion alternative. The options available for the military leadership are to either change the existing doctrine (C) or retain the conventional way of fighting (\sim C). So the military can be supported by the political leadership when the choice of the military leadership coincides with that of the civilian leadership (PS). However, when the civilian leadership asks the military to introduce a COIN doctrine first, and the military follows, the internal integrity is damaged because the conservative military will regard this suggestion as political intervention (I). Traditionally, the U.S. military has maintained a conventional doctrine to exhibit its strength to the world. When the conservative military leadership chooses to adapt counterinsurgency, the military is damaged professionally and militarily. In addition to this, the adaptation of COIN also requires additional costs in terms of military resources as well as the lives of military personnel, because compared to conventional warfare, COIN takes longer and is harder to implement (AC). This extra cost may not occur if the military continues to implement an existing conventional warfare strategy. As for the outcome of military doctrine in real warfare, the military leadership will obtain the credit for winning when its elected doctrine turns out to be successful (W), and there would be an additional payoff for winning with a COIN doctrine because of its difficulty to implement (WL). No matter which strategy is used, defeat in war brings disgrace on the military and therefore a military cost (MC) will be assigned the military leadership when it loses a war.

In this game theoretic model, the result of a war under a determined doctrine is not known in advance, therefore there is a need to introduce probabilistic situations with the Nature move. The end nodes of the game are Nature moves (N) that influence the result of a war waged under either a COIN or conventional doctrine. It is reasonable to assume that the chance of winning will vary depending upon the chosen doctrine. Therefore, the probability of winning a war under COIN is represented by 'p' while 'q' refers to the chance of winning under a conventional doctrine. Because of the initial assumption that the U.S. military is facing or expects to encounter an irregular adversary, p is assumed to be greater than q. The general rule of the game is that it will be a sequential game. The civilian leadership's decisions should be well observed by the military leadership under the democratic system.



<Figure 5.1: Conservative Military Leadership and Doctrinal Choice>

The extensive form of the game is depicted in Figure 5.1. This graphical expression will help readers understand how the game is played. When the civilian leadership chooses to support COIN and the military leadership implements it, this

interaction ends up as the left most Nature move node. If the war is expected to be won using a COIN doctrine, the civilian leadership will obtain a payoff consisting of a summation of loyalty (L), winning (W), and winning with legitimacy (WL), which will be reduced by the costs of a long war (LC). With regard to the payoff for the military leadership, they will suffer disgrace by the suggestion of the civilian leadership to implement a change in doctrine (I) and suffer from the additional military costs of a protracted war (AC), but they will gain from the positive benefits of winning (W), winning with legitimacy (WL).

At the right branch on the far left side of the Nature node is depicted the situation where the U.S. military is defeated by an irregular enemy, even if it has implemented a COIN doctrine. In this case, the civilian leadership will lose the costs of a long war (LC) and political costs (PC) caused by defeat in war, while they continue to maintain loyalty from the military leadership as their order is accepted (L). While being defeated, the military will lose the additional military costs (AC), integrity (I), and the blame for the defeat (MC). The expected payoffs of these two situations are calculated by probabilities of the state of the world by the Nature moves of p and $1-p$.

In the same vein, the second node from the left depicts the situation where the civilian leadership suggests a COIN doctrine but the military leadership does not follow that recommendation. Therefore the U.S. military faces conflicts by implementing a conventional warfare doctrine. When a war is won by the U.S. side, then both the civilian and the military leadership will secure the payoff of winning (W). Although the U.S. military wins with a conventional warfare strategy, the military will not be supported by the civilian leadership (PS). However, when a war is lost, the civilian leadership will suffer the political costs (PC), while the military

leadership will lose political support (PS) and endure the military costs for the defeat (MC).

The two nodes on the right side are almost symmetrical with the two on the left side under the same rule. Under the situation in which the civilian leadership keeps silent and the military leadership introduces a COIN doctrine, the political leadership will have a payoff of $W+WL-LC$, while the military leadership will obtain a payoff of $W+WL-PS-AC$, when the U.S. military is expected to succeed on the battlefield. On the other hand, if the outcome of war is anticipated to be unsuccessful the payoff for the civilian leadership will be $-LC-PC$ while that of the military leadership will be expressed as $-AC-PS-MC$. The other node on the far right side depicts the case where the civilian leadership has taken no action and the military decides to maintain a traditional doctrine. The civilian leadership will secure the benefits of $L+W$ when the war is expected to be won but will obtain a payoff of $L-PC$ if the opposite occurs. In the same situation, the military leadership will be given a payoff of W when the victory is expected or $-MC$ in an unsuccessful result.

In order to solve the game, the first thing to do is to observe how each Nature move with certain probability can be transformed into an expected payoff that can be compared with all the other moves. The expected payoff of a certain action is simply the summation of the payoffs of all possible outcomes that are caused by the action, multiplied by the probability that each outcome will occur.¹⁷⁰ For example, the expected payoff of the most left node is calculated as follow;


$$EPCL (SC) = p(L+W+WL-LC) + (1-p)(L-LC-PC)=pW+pWL+L-LC-PC+pPC$$

$$EPML (SC) = p(-I+W+WL-AC)+(1-p)(-I-AC-MC)=pW+pWL+pMC-AC-I-$$

¹⁷⁰ Shepsle and Bonchek, *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*, 34.

MC¹⁷¹

The expected payoff for the civilian leadership is the combination of two possible cases, namely: win or lose. This can be obtained by the summation of the expected payoff for the two cases. The probability of winning ‘p’ is assigned by the Nature move and it is multiplied by the probability of a pure payoff when there is a win. The probability of losing is automatically 1-p because the summation of all possible probabilities should be ‘1’. The expected payoff of losing is the product of 1-p times the pure payoff of a defeat. The expected payoff of one node is the summation of these two payoffs. These processes are shown above. Following this, the expected payoff of this game is represented in Figure 5.2.



<Figure 5.2: Roll Back Equilibrium in a Conservative Military Leadership>

This game can be solved by applying roll back equilibrium. As mentioned above this is a sequential game that allows backward induction, which means that

¹⁷¹ EPCL: Expected Payoff of the Civilian Leadership. SC: strategy of Suggestion (S) by the Civilian leadership and Change (C) by the military leadership. EPML: Expected Payoff of the Military Leadership.

“using roll back involves starting to think about what will happen at all the terminal nodes, and literally “rolling back” through the tree to the initial node as you do your analysis.”¹⁷² Applying this concept to this game, the starting points for rolling back are all four terminal nodes for the military leadership. On the left terminal node, the military leadership compares choices between ‘change’ and ‘not change,’ to determine which option delivers the bigger payoffs between $pW+pWL+pMC-AC-I-MC$ and $qW+qMC-PS-MC$. Since the conservative military emphasizes the integrity of the military, it is reasonable to assume that the value of ‘I’ is very large number compared to the other choice of the military leadership which is ‘not change.’

This analogy is the same in the terminal node on the right side. The conservative military leadership should choose the option of ‘not change’ because of the payoff of $qW+qMC-MC$ is expected to be greater than that of $pW+pWL+pMC-AC-PS-MC$. For the military leadership, the ‘not change’ option is chosen in both terminal nodes.

The next step is rolling back to the decision of the civilian leadership to choose one of the two options rolled back from the military leadership’s decisions. The payoff of $qW+qPC-PC$ is smaller than that of $qW+L+qPC-PC$, therefore the civilian leadership’s choice should be ‘not suggest.’ The final outcome of this game is the sequential interaction of $\{\sim S; \sim C\}$ that the civilian leadership does not suggest any change in military doctrine and the military maintains the existing military doctrine. The equilibrium of the game is represented in the red circle in Figure 5.2.

There is another way to represent the game. The tree figures illustrated above are called the extensive form, which is good for depicting the flow of interactions and moves of the players. This form of expression does not describe all the possible

¹⁷² Dixit and Skeath, *Game of Strategy*, 49.

strategies that players can choose. The strategic form compensates for this shortfall of the extensive form. All possible choices that each player can use are displayed in the strategic form in Table 5.1.

Since there is only one information set for the civilian leadership, there are only two possible moves, namely, ‘suggest (S)’ or ‘not suggest (~S),’ while the military leadership has four selections available because there are two information sets caused by a sequential movement. CC stands for the strategy when the military leadership chooses ‘change’ and when the civilian leadership’s decision is ‘suggest’ or the military leadership can select ‘change’ when the other player chooses ‘not suggest.’ This is the case because the latter player can see what the former selects right before the latter chooses an option.

		Military Leadership			
		CC	C~C	~CC	~C~C
Civilian Leadership	S	$(pW+pWL+pPC+L-LC-PC, pW+pWL+pMC-AC-I-MC)$	$(pW+pWL+pPC+L-LC-PC, pW+pWL+pMC-AC-I-MC)$	$(qW-PC+qPC, qW-PS-MC-qMC)$	$(qW-PC+qPC, qW-PS-MC-qMC)$
	~S	$(pW+pWL+pPC-L-LC, pW+pWL+pMC-AC-I-MC)$	$(qW+L+qPC-PC, qW+qMC-MC)$	$(pW+pWL+pPC-L-LC, pW+pWL+pMC-AC-I-MC)$	$(qW+L+qPC-PC, qW+qMC-MC)$

<Table 5.1: Expected Payoffs in the Strategic Form>

Since all the expected payoffs are shown in the strategic form, all the possible solutions of the game can be found. The use of cell-by-cell inspection and the Nash equilibrium are helpful in finding solutions. The equilibrium is a certain point where each player’s best responses are met, normally called the Nash equilibrium.¹⁷³ Through a cell-by-cell inspection, three Nash equilibria that are high-lighted are found. In all three cells, both players have no intention to move to another cell for the purpose of a better payoff given the other’s choice. However, the first two equilibria

¹⁷³ Herbert Gintis, *Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 43.

are not as strong as the third, because they are not sub-game perfect equilibria which are defined as a set of strategies that for every proper sub-game, “the restriction of those strategies to the sub-game forms a Nash equilibrium.”¹⁷⁴


In this game there are three sub-games; two sub-games for the military leadership and one whole game for both actors. The first two Nash equilibria do not satisfy all of the necessary conditions, and therefore are less credible threats that require a commitment from the other player. For instance, the Nash equilibrium $\{\sim S; C\sim C\}$ implies that the column chooser commits to change the doctrine if the row chooser suggests a change, and to not change the doctrine if the row chooser does not suggest a change. The latter situation coincides with the roll-back Nash Equilibrium described above, yet the column chooser can commit to the former course of action only because it knows that the row chooser will choose $\sim S$, so the column chooser will not need to implement the threat. However, if the game is truncated to the sub-game when the row chooser has already opted for S , the column chooser will not play C and instead switch to $\sim C$. Thus, this equilibrium is not a sub-game perfect.

The same is true about the Nash equilibrium $\{S; \sim CC\}$. Indeed, the column chooser will choose $\sim C$ if the row chooser opts for S , but the column chooser can force the row chooser to do that, if the column chooser threatens to select C if the row chooser does otherwise. However, this threat is not credible, in the sense that if the row player has chosen $\sim C$, and the game is reduced to only that sub-game; the column player will select $\sim C$. Hence, this is not sub-game perfect either. Therefore, the final one, the red circled cell is the final equilibrium in this game. In both the strategic and extensive forms of the game, the conservative military leadership does not attempt to change existing military doctrine regardless of the civilian leadership’s pressure.

¹⁷⁴ Morrow, op.cit., 129.

Influence of Civilian Education on Doctrinal Choice


Is the result the same under different military leadership? The second model is designed to demonstrate the choice of military doctrine by a less conservative military leadership. There is no change in the civilian leadership’s characteristics, but the military leadership is assumed to be less conservative. Being less conservative has two meanings in this model. There is less concern about maintaining strict conservative integrity, more emphasis is placed on individuality, and there is more concern about maintaining political support, since it is closer to civilian society.



<Figure 5.3: Less Conservative Military Leadership and Doctrinal Choice>

When the payoff of integrity (I) is assumed to be zero, there are four spots affected. The four terminal nodes of ‘change’ by the military leadership do not have a payoff of integrity (I), given the fact that the less conservative military leadership believe that the U.S. military needs to move away from the dogmatic regular army

oriented doctrine.



<Figure 5.4: Expected Payoffs under a Less Conservative Military Leadership>

The expected payoffs are shown in Figure 5.4 after taking all probabilistic circumstances into account. As in the conservative model, the roll back equilibrium can be realized. On the left side of the game tree, it is for the military leadership to decide whether they will change doctrine or not by comparing payoffs between $pW+pWL+pMC-AC-MC$ and $qW+qMC-PS-MC$. The winning payoff (W) and the defeating cost (MC) are relatively the same between the two sides, since one side represents securing political support, and the other side represents losing political support. In this regard, the less conservative military determine that ‘change’ is more profitable than ‘not change.’ On the right part of the game, with the same logic, the option of ‘not change’ that bestows larger payoff to the less conservative leadership is chosen.

The next stage deals with which option the civilian leadership will choose. The options available for them are to choose between ‘suggest’ change, given that the

military will accept (SC, $pW+pWL+L+pPC-LC-PC$) or 'not suggest' change, given that the military will not accept ($\sim S\sim C$, $qW+L+qPC-PC$). The critical element in this decision is whether or not pWL is greater than LC . If the expected utility of winning the war with legitimacy (WL) is larger than the cost associated with a longer war of COIN (LC), the civilian leadership's choice will be 'suggest' or 'not suggest.'

Winning legitimacy is related to the goal of the current wars being fought by the U.S. military, namely, establishing a stable environment and being governed under democratic rules. According to the address that Leon Panetta, U.S. Defense Secretary, delivered for commemorating the official end of the Iraqi War, the mission of the Iraq war was building a government that could govern and secure itself.¹⁷⁵ In addition, from the U.S. official document regarding foreign policy, *The National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, establishing accountable and representative governance is a core mission of U.S. foreign policy.¹⁷⁶ Killing and demolishing enemy troops is not enough to accomplish this mission. The end that kinetic military operations bring is no longer a sufficient condition for achieving the mission. Winning people's hearts and minds and attempting to reduce civilian casualties is an additional mission for the completion of this kind of war. Therefore, the civilian leadership is assumed to place more emphasis on winning with legitimacy (WL) than enduring the cost of a long war (LC). The roll back equilibrium of this game is the strategy that the civilian leadership chooses 'suggest' change and the military leadership responds to 'change' existing

¹⁷⁵ RFE/RL, "U.S. Military Formally Ends Iraq Mission," *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty* (December 16, 2011), http://www.rferl.org/content/us_military_formally_ends_iraq_mission/24422746.html (accessed on December 15, 2011).

¹⁷⁶ The White House, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (Washington D.C, June 2011), 5. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/06/29/national-strategy-counterterrorism> (accessed on July 4, 2011).

traditional doctrine (SC).

		Military Leadership			
		C-C	C-C	~CC	~C-C
Civilian Leadership	§	$(pW+pWL+L+pPC-LC-PC, pW+pWL+pMC-AC-MC)$	$(pW+pWL+L+pPC-LC-PC, pW+pWL+pMC-AC-MC)$	$(qW+qPC-PC, qW+qMC-PS-MC)$	$(qW+qPC-PC, qW+qMC-PS-MC)$
	~§	$(pW+pWL+pPC-LC-PC, pW+pWL+pMC-AC-PS-MC)$	$(qW+L+qPC-PC, qW+qMC-MC)$	$(pW+pWL+pPC-LC-PC, pW+pWL+pMC-AC-PS-MC)$	$(qW+L+qPC-PC, qW+qMC-MC)$

<Table 5.2: Expected Payoffs of Less Conservative in the Strategic Form>

The examination of the strategic form of the game is to take all possible situations into consideration as shown in Table 5.2. There are three possible Nash equilibria in this game, two of which are not sub-game perfect equilibria. The left most and upper cell, illustrates that the civilian leadership chooses ‘suggest’ and the military leadership decides to choose ‘change’ regardless of the civilian leadership’s choice.

Two Models and Change in Military Doctrine

In the two models above, the change in military leadership produces a different outcome in the choice of military doctrine, while keeping the civilian leadership constant. These game theoretical models are very helpful to illustrate how the players related to a decision making process, interacted with each other and how other considerations affected their decisions.

The two models that I have shown above exemplify two extreme cases: extreme conservative versus least conservative. However, in a real world such an extreme case is hard to find. Instead most cases are located somewhere in the middle. The degree of conservatism should be taken into account. Possibly, there are two

ways to capture the variation in military conservatism. One is the introduction of another Nature move in the game theory models above. Another unknown probabilistic factor containing a degree of military conservatism can be added to represent the current status of the military leadership's make up. This may be possible but would be difficult to interpret in a world made more complex by adding an unknown situation given that this will be the third factor in addition to the two probabilistic factors (p: winning probability with counterinsurgency, q: winning probability with conventional doctrine).

It may also be possible to introduce a variable using a statistical model that represents the degree of conservatism in the military leadership. Adding such a variable may not have an impact on the relationship between the military leadership and the change in military doctrine, but it can offer a dynamical correlation between them. A statistical model that can vary the degree of conservatism will be introduced and analyzed with other factors that may influence the relationship.

Chapter VI

A Statistical Model for Determining Military Doctrine

Introduction

In the previous chapters, I examined the possibility of a change in U.S. military doctrine and introduced a theory regarding a change in doctrine that was illustrated by a game theoretic model. At this point I shall build a statistical model based on the data that I have accumulated, and then test the theory.

I have focused on the reasons for the conspicuous change in military doctrine towards COIN recently during the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while explaining why there was little change in doctrine and practice after the Vietnam War. During the past decade, the main focus of military operations has shifted to an equally balanced approach of killing the enemy and securing the trust of the people and stabilizing operations. The Keystone Operational Manual of the U.S. Army, *the 2008 version of Field Manual 3-0 Operations*, established the concept of full spectrum operations, namely, simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability as the tenet of the Army operations.¹⁷⁷

This change is significant given the fact that it used to focus exclusively on offensive and defensive operations, leaving other operations peripheral. I built up a theory about how this change occurred by focusing on the role of the military leadership who are the main actor deciding the content of military doctrine. As I

¹⁷⁷ Robert L. Caslen, Jr., "Change 1 to Field Manual 3-0: The Way the Army Fights Today," *Military Review* (March-April, 2011): 84.

discussed in Chapter III, traditional U.S. military doctrine focused on conventional warfare based on the concepts of mass maneuver and complete annihilation of the enemy, which were influenced by von Clausewitz's and de Jomini's theories. On the other hand, the COIN doctrine aims at winning the hearts and minds of the people, which I described as "Democratic Warfare" and that this approach to warfare was influenced by Sun Tzu's preservation theory. The key characteristic of the COIN doctrine is a people oriented approach, rather than the conventional warfare doctrine which focused on killing the enemy. This kind of change cannot occur without some internal influence as well as external pressure.

The military leadership theory places more emphasis on internal change initiated by leaders in uniform. This does not mean that other factors are completely excluded. I also stressed how the role of the military leadership has been somewhat diminished under democratic rule under which the use of the military is one of the means employed by politicians to reach a political goal. Since COIN contains unorthodox characteristics that differ from the traditional perspective, this doctrine cannot be chosen in the absence of an unorthodox influence in military leadership. Therefore, finding the factors that influence the military leadership to be less conservative is one way to explore the relationship between doctrinal change and the military leadership.

Since the military has been defined as a conservative organization, it is hard to implement change without some external influence. In my theory, there are two kinds of external influences: direct and indirect. Political intervention can be regarded as a direct influence while an ongoing assimilation process is an indirect one. My theory focuses on the assimilation process. Civilian society is more liberal when compared to a military organization and more interactions with it produce the possibility that the

military leadership will choose a doctrine that strays from conventional warfare doctrine. Interactions with civilian society also play an important role in alleviating the degree of conservatism in the military. However, all ranks of military officers do not have the capability to affect policy choice and often military officers below the command level of general and colonel feel uncomfortable expressing their own ideas that are not in harmony with conventional military culture, even if they obtain civilian educations. Based on these considerations, I drew hypotheses that focus on military leadership, military experience, and political pressure.

Research Design and Application of Statistical Model to Test Hypotheses

Statistical Model

In order to test these hypotheses, I introduce a simple statistical model that contains variables to be tested including factors that may affect these variables.

$$CON_i = \alpha + \beta_1 CE_i + \beta_2 CV_i + \beta_3 (CE_i * CV_i) + \varepsilon_i^{178}$$

Dependent Variable

This variable measures the change in the degree of doctrinal emphasis regarding the preparation required for conventional and COIN warfare. However, measuring the degree of doctrinal emphasis is a very challenging task. By examining the proposed military budget allocated to conventional and COIN expenses, based on political and military input, I can determine where doctrinal priorities are placed.

The portion of the budget allocated to Strategic Forces is a measure of the

¹⁷⁸ CON: Degree of Conservatism, CE: Civilian Education, CV: Control Variables, α : Interception, β : coefficient, and ε : Error term.

degree of doctrinal priority given to conventional warfare. Because it is difficult to categorize most expenses as being related to either conventional or counterinsurgency I chose the most relevant program category, strategic forces, that most scholars agree should be allocated to COIN.¹⁷⁹ The budget for strategic forces includes Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Strategic Bomber Squadrons, Army Air Defense Firing Batteries, and so on. These can be used as parameters for a conventional warfare force that is preparing for a state challenger. The ratio of the strategic forces budget divided by the total budget is the dependent variable. The fluctuation of the value of this ratio represents a change in priority of military doctrine. Since I used a slightly different measurement in an earlier chapter for capturing doctrinal priority, I used the same measure for checking the robustness of this model.


Independent Variable

A key element for creating this variable is determining the proportion of the military leadership that earned a graduate degree from a civilian university after being commissioned. I believe having exposure to such an education played a major role in reducing the degree of conservativeness in the military. While the boundary for military leadership is not clearly defined, according to Michael E. O’Hanlon eighteen four star generals were eligible to be included in the key leadership group, namely, each of the ten regional and functional commands, each of the six service chiefs, and the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS).¹⁸⁰ I collected

¹⁷⁹ This measurement of conservatism is slightly different from what was used in chapter II, where the budget allocations of two categories were directly compared with each other. The main reason why I used this measure is because of the inaccessibility of the data for the COIN category, which contains the budget for special operations forces and C3I. The former is only available for the period after the Special Operations Command was founded in 1987.

¹⁸⁰ Michael E. O’Hanlon, *The Science of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technology, Logistics, and Combat Outcomes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 6. I replaced

background information for two hundred and forty generals from 1948 to 2010 through open sources, namely, Marquis *Who's Who* was a main source and Wikipedia was a secondary source. Because the budget request is usually submitted in February, whoever was a member of the leadership group at that point served for the full year. The independent variable is calculated to be the percentage determined by dividing the number of generals with a civilian education by the total number of military leaders.¹⁸¹



<Graph 6.1: A Percentage of Military Leaders with Civilian Education >

The overall trend of the percentage of military leaders with a civilian education at the level of Masters and above is shown in Graph 6.1. Over time, the number of key leaders with a civilian education has increased and reached one hundred percent in 2002, then slightly decreased to a moderate level of sixty percent. However, the trend was not without fluctuation. From the 1950s to the early 1960s the

Marine Corps with Chairman of JCS.

¹⁸¹ The number of the military leadership varies depending on the existence of a position. Especially combatant commands vary year by year. For more information, see Appendix I.

number of military leaders with civilian educations started to increase but declined during the 1960s until the early 1970s. Since the early 1980s, the trend has generally increased.

Control Variables

In order to avoid a spurious relationship between the civilian educational variable and doctrinal choice, several control variables should be considered. For the international variables, I included a Cold War dummy factor and the threat of a State Challenger factor measured by the military expenditure¹⁸² of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and that of China after the Cold War. Because I defined conventional strategy to be a preparation for war against a state challenger, the overall degree of conventionality should be affected by the threat of a challenging state. The size of the military budgets for challenging states is a reasonable measurement to represent the capabilities of a threatening state. During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was the eminent threat to the U.S. and after the demise of the Soviet Union China has been viewed as a potential challenging state by the U.S. For the Challenging State factor, the level of the threat is calculated as the ratio of the military budget of a challenging state to that of the U.S., because the perceived threat will originate from the gap in capabilities between the two.

¹⁸² This data comes from CINC index. The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) index is constructed as a part of Correlates of War (COW) Project. It is called as the National Material Capabilities data set and contains six capabilities components for a given year, (Energy Consumption, Iron and Steel Production, Military Expenditure, Military Personnel, Total Population, and Urban Population). The CINC score is computed by summing all observations on each of six components and by converting each state's absolute component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across the six components. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985," *International Interactions*, Vol. 14, 115-32. <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htm#cinc> (accessed on October 11, 2011). The CINC index is only available by 2007 and the rest of data are obtained in SIPRI data set. <http://first.sipri.org/> (accessed on December 15, 2011).

For the domestic variable, I insert the President's Party Affiliation, the Party Controlling the Congress, the Election Year dummy, and the Domestic Economic factors (e.g. the unemployment rate) in the model. As mentioned above, each political party tends to have a distinctive preference for military doctrine because each party has a different political constituency. Fordham argues that a Republican president tends to seek a policy to balance the national budget and avoid inflation at the expense of unemployment by relying on nuclear weapons and air power because "[T]his force structure was substantially less expensive and did not interfere with the Republicans' preferred fiscal policy. Furthermore, tolerating the risks of relying on nuclear weapons found greater political support in the Republican party than it would have in the Democratic Party."¹⁸³

If there was a Democratic president in February of the year being considered the presidential party affiliation factor is coded '1', otherwise '0'. In addition, I included an interactive variable that contains factors for the proportion of generals with a civilian education as well as for the presidential party affiliation, which measure the difference in the degree of change in the budget allocation when conditioned on presidential party affiliation. Both variables are lagged by one year to take all information available into account.

For the same reason, the Party Controlling the Congress factor is added. When both the Senate and the House of Representatives are controlled by the Democratic Party, it is coded '1' and coded '0.5' when it controls only one of them, and when both are controlled by the Republican Party '0' was coded.

During an election year, a military budget may be different than in a normal

¹⁸³ Fordham, "Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending," 67.

year, because during the election campaign, candidates have to pay attention to independent voters as well as loyal supporters.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, the allocation of the military budget may not represent the military's best interest. Because the election year is already known when the budget is planned, this variable is not lagged. For example, the military budget for the fiscal year 2000 is requested in 1999 and the election in 2000 has an effect on this planning process and affects the budget for 2000. Therefore the Election Year dummy factor is coded '1' in an election year, otherwise '0'.

The economic situation may influence the choice of military doctrine. In a bad economy politicians may shift money from the military budget to boost the economy. Especially, when the unemployment rate is high, politicians may have an incentive to convert some resources normally allocated for technique based military spending to labor intensive industries.¹⁸⁵ In order to control the effect of economic conditions on allocations to the military budget, I included the Unemployment factor lagged by two years.

The Ongoing War factor is included under the domestic effect category because it is only being considered as it impacts the people in the U.S. I chose four wars that the U.S. was heavily involved in. The factors for the years of the Korean War, Vietnam War, Gulf War, and Wars on Terror are coded '1' otherwise '0'.

The last variable that should not be excluded in the budget analysis is a lagged dependent variable. Since the process of budget planning is usually based on the previous year's budget there is a possibility that that year's budget will be similar to last year's. This causes an autocorrelation problem that should be addressed in order

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 78.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 78-79.

to capture pure relationships among variables. All other factors within the categorized variable except for Election Year are lagged one or two year(s) in order to avoid any confusion of a causal nature.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
The Degree of Conservatism				
Budget Allocation for Strategic Forces over Total Forces(*1000)	12.48	7.31	3.53	30.58
Assimilation Process				
Proportion of Generals with Civilian Education (%)	38.73	29.73	0	100
Domestic Effect				
President Party affiliation (D=1, R=0)	.45	.5	0	1
Party controlling Congress	.73	.40	0	1
Unemployment Rate	5.60	1.67	2.4	9.7
Ongoing War	.32	.47	0	1
International Factor				
Threat of Challenging State	.71	.46	.06	1.51
Cold War	.71	.46	0	1

<Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics>

Interactive Variables

The interactive effects of constituent variables should not be neglected, since there is a possibility that a variable may have a different effect, when it is conditioned on certain factors. For example, the effect of a civilian education under a republican president may not be the same as under a democratic president. In order to capture the conditional effect, I added two interactive factors; Civilian Education & Ongoing War, and Civilian Education & President Party affiliation.

The Unit of Observation and Time Span

The unit of observation is a budget year because budget allocations vary year by year. The data collection in this research begins in 1948 because the publication of Article X by George F. Kennan appeared in 1947. This article laid the foundation for a Cold War strategy, which was called ‘Containment.’ Following the publication of Kennan’s article U.S. foreign policy started to focus on potential state challengers to prevent them from expanding their influence and to help maintain the influence of the U.S. in its international relations. The end year of data collection is 2010, but the number of observations in the statistical model is sixty three, because there are several lagged variables.

Empirical Results

I have tested my theory under three models, the first tested domestic factors, the second tested domestic and international factors, and the third tested for robustness. Under the first model, I tested the theory first using constituent variables and then with interactive factors. Both tests illustrate that a civilian education has a significant effect on reducing the conservativeness of military doctrine, given that the coefficient of this variable is negative and statistically significant. This represents that as the number of generals in the military leadership with a civilian education increases the conservativeness in military doctrine decreases.

As for other factors that have significance, the Ongoing War factor has the expected direction and significance of a coefficient. All wars included in the model were not military engagements against a challenging state but rather against small states or non-state actors. Therefore, less strategic forces were needed during these

on-going wars.¹⁸⁶ During the period when wars were fought against a non-challenging state, the conventional doctrine did not work properly, so a less conventional warfare doctrine was needed. The interactive variable which includes the factors for civilian education (CE) and ongoing war (OW) turns out to be positively significant. This implies that the effect of a civilian education is diminished in an on-going war. For example, during an ongoing war the military is more resistant to change even though the number of generals, who had experienced a civilian education, increased. This implies that the doctrine in existence right before entering a war was very difficult to change regardless of the influence of other factors. However, it is too early to draw any conclusions from the analysis of domestic factors.

The international variable is included in model II. The president party affiliation factor obtains statistical support when there are no interactive variables. It is negatively correlated with conservative military doctrine. This is consistent with what Fordham suggests in his article in 2002, when he argued that Democratic presidents tend to support non-strategic forces, while Republican presidents are more likely to support strategic forces. However, when the interactive variables were introduced, the president party affiliation factor lost its significance, while the civilian education factor maintained its relevance.

There is no additional or attenuated effect of a civilian education under different administrations. This means that there is no conditional effect of president party affiliation on the conservatism of military doctrine. The ongoing war and the interactive variable of civilian education and ongoing war continue to be significant.

¹⁸⁶ As for the Korean War, it seems to be a proxy war directed by Soviet Union through North Korea that fought against South Korea who was a proxy of the U.S. Therefore, I ran regression with data after the Korean War and the results were not much different from what were shown in the Table.

Coefficients				
	Model I (Domestic)		Model II (Domestic and International)	
	Without Interaction	With Interaction	Without Interaction	With Interaction
Military Leaders with Civilian Education(CE)	-.02* (.01)	-.05** (.02)	-.04** (.02)	-.07** (.03)
President Party affiliation(PP)	-.90 (.50)	-1.4 (.95)	-1.15** (.55)	-1.51 (.95)
Interactive (CE*PP)		.02 (.02)		.02 (.02)
President Election Year (PEY)	.54 (.53)	.52 (.52)	.57 (.53)	.48 (.52)
Unemployment Rate(UR)	-.25 (.17)	-.24 (.15)	-.17 (.16)	-.14 (.14)
Party Controlling Congress(PCC)	-.08 (.46)	.05 (.47)	.12 (.54)	.06 (.54)
Ongoing War(OW)	-1.35*** (.61)	-2.89*** (1.07)	-1.72** (.68)	-3.28*** (1.14)
Interactive (CE*OW)		.04** (.02)		.04** (.02)
Cold War(CW)			-.53 (1.07)	.96 (1.36)
State Challenger's Threat(SCT)			-.81 (1.00)	-1.49 (1.16)
Lag Dependent Variable	.88*** (.06)	.85*** (.063)	.86*** (.06)	.81*** (.07)
Constant	4.02* (2.06)	5.42** (2.28)	5.46** (2.35)	6.16** (2.41)
N	63	63	63	63
R-Square	.956	.960	.958	.962

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01

<Table 6.2: Domestic and International Factors for Doctrinal Change>

Based on these two models, a civilian education for the military leadership is negatively correlated to the degree of military conservatism. The first hypothesis predicted and confirmed that the military leadership affected by the level of exposure to a liberal civilian education has a negative correlation with conservatism in the military.

Another factor that has consistent statistical support is the ongoing war factor. The implication here is that for most of the wars that the U.S. had engaged in, the U.S. military needed troops that were less conventionally oriented. This implies that when the U.S. waged war, it often was a war that it had not prepared for. It needed to change its tactics to adapt to unexpected situations. When the military faces obstacles that the current doctrine cannot handle, its leadership is more apt to institute change than is the civilian leadership. This hypothesis is also statistically meaningful.

When the interactive variable consisting of the factors for civilian education and presidential party affiliation was introduced in model II, the factor representing the political party of the president lost its significance, while the civilian education factor maintained its validity. The purpose for introducing the interactive variable was to capture its conditional effect on the constituent variable. This result implies that there is no additional benefit achieved for the political party that is conditioned on the level of civilian education in the military leadership and vice versa. However, since the introduction of the interactive variable changed the effect of the civilian leadership, this can be interpreted to mean that when there is pressure from the civilian leadership regarding a change in doctrine: its implementation will be more directly influenced by the degree of conservatism of the military leadership. This result confirms the third political independent hypothesis.

The interactive variable that measures the factors for the proportion of military

leaders with a civilian education, and ongoing war experience reveals a positive correlation between the two. When both conditions are met, there is an ascending effect on military conservatism.

These results do not have a large impact on the robustness check, in which a dependent variable can be affected by measuring the ratio of strategic forces to the sum of the mobility forces and strategic forces. In this model, the presidential party affiliation factor obtains statistical support equal to point one (.1). This result implies that the role played by the civilian leadership to influence doctrinal choice can be either qualified or controversial, depending on the data set that is used for testing. Since my theory does not actively focus on the role of the political leadership, this will be left for a later research.

Discussion and Conclusion

Based on the empirical results, the degree of conservativeness in military doctrine is influenced by on-going wars, partially by presidential party affiliation, and the amount of civilian education experienced by the military leadership. Once other conditions are introduced, only two constituent variables composed of the factors measuring the level of civilian education in the military leadership, and an ongoing war consistently sustain significance. These two variables contain military characteristics that when compared to other variables that measure factors, such as the electoral cycle, the unemployment rate and a challenging state's capabilities, are not proven to affect their relationship.

	Coefficients	
	Model III (Robustness Check)	
	Without Interaction	With Interaction
Military Leaders with Civilian Education(CE)	-.04** (.02)	-.06** (.02)
President Party affiliation(PP)	-.97* (.51)	-1.01 (.89)
Interactive (CE*PP)		.01 (.02)
President Election Year (PEY)	.61 (.56)	.55 (.55)
Unemployment Rate(UR)	-.14 (.14)	-.12 (.13)
Party Controlling Congress(PCC)	.02 (.50)	-.04 (.51)
Ongoing War(OW)	-1.75*** (.59)	-3.02*** (.98)
Interactive (CE*OW)		.04** (.02)
Cold War(CW)	-.36 (1.07)	.65 (1.21)
State Challenger's Threat(SCT)	-1.07 (1.01)	-1.57 (1.12)
Lag Dependent Variable	.87*** (.064)	.83*** (.07)
Constant	5.62** (2.32)	6.22** (2.40)
N	63	63
R-Square	.957	.960

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

*: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01

<Table 6.3: Robustness Check for Change in Military Doctrine>


In contrast with Posen's argument that the civilian political leadership is the key influence for changing military doctrine, the outcome of the military leadership model is proven to give more emphasis on the role of the military than civilian leadership. This implies that when the military encountered unexpected circumstances while implementing operational plans during a war, the military leadership attempted to change doctrine in order to adapt to such changing circumstances. This is consistent with the fact that the publication of the COIN manual was a military originated project.¹⁸⁷

In addition, as the number of key leaders with a civilian education increased the military has shifted away from a dogmatic conservative state-centered doctrine. This can provide an answer as to why there was no change in military doctrine during and after the Vietnam War, but significant change during the wars on terror. From the mid 1990s the level of military leaders with a civilian education was sustained at just above two thirds of the total leaders until 2007. This is a very high level compared to the situation that existed during the 1970s. Although General Petraeus played an essential role in reintroducing the COIN doctrine in Iraq, without the support of the military leadership this might not have been successful.

In the same vein, the slight decline in the proportion of the civilian education level during since 2002 may imply that there is a possibility that the military may revert to a conventionally oriented doctrine. This prediction becomes less convincing when the interactive factors of a civilian education and ongoing war are analyzed. The positive significant coefficient of the interactive factor (CE*OW) weakens the effect

¹⁸⁷ John Nagl's comment in The Daily Show in 2007, <http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-august-23-2007/lt--col--john-nagl> (accessed on January 13, 2011).

of a civilian education on military doctrine. This means that during an on-going war the slope of the education effect is shallower. If this decline happened during peace time, the U.S. military doctrine would go back to a conservative approach. But what has recently happened is that the weakening effect of the on-going war is less likely to abruptly revert to a conventional doctrine. However, if this declining trend in civilian education continues after the war, there will be a high possibility for a return to a conventional state centered military.



<Graph 6.2: Interactive Effect of Civilian Education and Ongoing War >

Graph 6.2 illustrates that the difference in the degree of conservatism during an ongoing war versus peace time becomes smaller as the level of civilian education in the military leadership increases until the intersection point of around .87. For example, in 1975 when the Vietnam War was over, the percentage of the military leadership with a civilian education was around 25%. The expected degrees of conservatism were 11.54 when there was no war and 10.86 during ongoing war. The

degree of conservatism during the war was at a relatively high level, and even became more conservative after the war (10.86→11.54) given that the mean value of expected conservatism without war is 10.21 and with an ongoing war is 10.7.

However, it is anticipated that after the Iraqi and Afghanistan wars that the low level of conservatism will continue. In 2010, the proportion of the military leadership with a civilian education was 67 percent. The expected level of conservatism in the ongoing war is 9.1 and it is expected to increase to 9.38. These levels are less conservative than the mean value of expected conservatism. There is not much change expected after the war when the level of civilian education of the military leadership is high.

This is a partial answer to the question as to why there was no change in conventional military doctrine after the Vietnam War, while there was a change during both the Iraqi and Afghanistan wars and it is expected to be sustained it in the future.

The interaction with civilian society and the impacts it has on how the military operates can be construed to mean that military doctrine may be influenced by the civilian political leadership. However, the preferences of the civilian leadership fluctuated based on the priorities of the party in office, president party affiliation, etc. While the military is subject to civilian control in democracies, it cannot maintain sufficient consistency due to the changing demands of the two political parties. This can create anxiety for the military leadership, and may be a good reason for them to try to remain independent of civilian political preferences. In the final analysis, despite the unfolding demands regarding future doctrine as it may be dictated by either political party within the civilian leadership; greater increase in the rate of participation by senior military officers in the civilian education system can only serve to strengthen the bond and linkage between them and civilian society. The

way to deal with the anxiety experienced by the military as it is faced with bi-partisan opinions is to pay attention to the feelings of the civilian population, who elect those politicians who will exercise control over the military.

Chapter VII

Conclusion

General Discussion Points

At the beginning of this project, I raised five questions:

1. Why does the U.S. military have difficulty winning wars against smaller insurgent armies?
2. What prevents the U.S. from adapting a new way of fighting against an irregular enemy, the, so called COIN?
3. Has the U.S done anything to adjust?
4. Can we determine the essence of the U.S. strategy for asymmetric warfare?
5. What are the factors that influence a change in military doctrine?

To conclude this project, a brief summary of the answers to these questions as well as policy implication and the direction that future research will take will be discussed.

Reasons Why the U.S. Has Difficulty in Winning a Small War

A mismatch in doctrines is one of the reasons why a larger army sometimes has a hard time dealing with a smaller army. Traditionally the U.S. has employed a conventional warfare strategy, while its allegedly weaker and smaller opponents opted for unconventional guerrilla tactics. When both sides use the same military doctrine (conventional-conventional or nonconventional-nonconventional), the stronger actor is likely to win, while the weaker side has a better chance of winning when they implement a different strategy (conventional-nonconventional or nonconventional-

conventional).¹⁸⁸ The smaller insurgent armies tend to avoid direct kinetic contact with larger conventional forces simply because they cannot withstand a face-to-face confrontation with a large conventional force. Instead, the smaller insurgent armies preserve their power until their capacity is built over time so that it approximates that of the stronger side. The stronger side employing a conventional doctrine tries to eliminate its enemies as soon as possible, while the weaker side sustains its troops as long as possible by hiding behind ordinary people. One side is fighting to kill people, while the other side is biding its time to build up the size of its troops.

Reasons That Inhibit the U.S. from Adapting to Counterinsurgency

I have searched for the reasons why the U.S. military has avoided adopting an irregular warfare doctrine even though it had several successful experiences employing irregular operations in the Indian Wars and the Philippine Insurrection. I found that the U.S. military's orientation towards conservatism in doctrine was influenced by de Jomini's notion of mass maneuver and von Clausewitz's perspectives of politics and war. As an organization, the military prefers a big army as suggested by de Jomini. This trend toward the use of large armies and conservatism in doctrine was reinforced by the concept of having professional soldiers being subject to civilian control and not being included in partisan debates. These combined factors established the orientation towards conservatism in military doctrine that preferred large armies focused on wars against potential challenging states using regular troops.

Examining the Gestation Period for Possible Changes in Doctrine

What recently occurred domestically and internationally may produce changes

¹⁸⁸ Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict."

in how the U.S. military fights in the future. Based on an analysis of military budget allocations from 2000 to 2009, the U.S. military invested significantly more in irregular warfare rather than conventional warfare. The military budget for special operations forces and C3I & Space increased, while money for strategic forces and mobility forces declined by a statistically meaningful rate. This is an interesting finding and encourages further investigation into the factors that induced this change from a historically conservative military.

The Essence of an Irregular Doctrine in the U.S. Military

The main objective of the COIN doctrine is to win the hearts and minds of the people in order to isolate the insurgents from the general population. However, finding and killing insurgents hidden among the people has not been possible without reliable intelligence. Success in such military operations depends on how well non-military operations are performed. In order to win the people's trust, the first thing that the military needs is information regarding the civilian population's environment and it can offer security and stability through the construction of a social infrastructure and stable political systems. The military operation of COIN does not involve destroying and subjugating the enemy, but rather preserving the population. This orientation works better in guerrilla and irregular warfare. It was influenced by Sun Tzu's theory of preservation that emphasized winning wars by non-kinetic action.

Factors that Influence Change in Military Doctrine

However, the unresolved question is why doctrinal change occurred recently, but did not occur after the Vietnam War ended. In this project, I focused on the internal changes within the U.S. military leadership that should play an important role

in doctrinal change.

In this dissertation I employed various methodologies to prove that the exposure to a civilian education by senior military officers mitigates their conservatism regarding doctrine and encourages more flexibility in their thinking. I tested this argument with data that I collected from open sources regarding the civilian education that each member of the military leadership has been exposed to. Based on the results from this statistical test, the civilian education variable has proven to have had a statistically significant effect on reducing the degree of conservatism in the military. The assimilation process brought about as a byproduct of a civilian education is proven to play a pivotal role in doctrinal choice.

Policy Implications

These findings reveal the importance of the assimilation process offered through a higher education, and its impact upon conservatism in the military leadership. As change continues to rapidly accelerate in areas that affect national security and the battlefield, the need for the military leadership to adapt to such changing conditions also increases rapidly. Under such changing circumstances, flexibility is critical. The findings provided in this project strongly suggest that the assimilation process of a higher education increases the flexibility of military officers and will eventually play a role in adjusting doctrinal choices.

What this outcome suggests is that the U.S. military should promote programs that increase their contacts with civilian society. For example, the Republic of Korea (ROK) military is currently sending twenty field grade level military officers to

civilian firms such as Samsung, Hyundai, and Kia every year.¹⁸⁹ This attempt can be perceived as another form of assimilation that will also play a role in increasing the flexibility of the military.

Future Research

The relationship between the characteristics of the military leadership and the choice of military doctrine has been thoroughly investigated throughout this project. However, this does not mean that there is no room for future research. We should expand the scope of our analysis to include a large group of nations that are both democratic and non-democratic. Whether or not the result of this project will hold in other democratic states is worth pursuing. In addition, comparative studies about other type of regimes and their choice of doctrine based on internal changes of the military leadership may deliver a new field of research in civil-military relations literature.

Another way to expand this research is by changing the subject of the study. This research was about the effect of a civilian education on the correlation of military officers and change in military doctrine. In the future we may want to examine whether the education of military officers at a civilian school affects the attitudes of civilian students at such institutions toward the military. How the military officers perform in non-military organizations will be a good subject to try to find a way to build up a close relationship between the military and civilian society.

The third area for future research could involve studying whether a military officer's experience in obtaining an education mitigates his or her conservatism on other issues of social relevance. For example, sexual orientation, religious belief, etc.

¹⁸⁹ Hwang Joonho, "There is No Reporting Plate in Commercial Firms," *AsiaKyunje* January 15, 2012, <http://www.asiae.co.kr/news/view.htm?idxno=2012011510380824410> (accessed on January 18, 2012).

The final direction that I want to suggest for future research is the relationship between a grand strategy and military doctrine. Grand strategy gives an overarching framework for military strategy that is represented through military doctrine. Grand strategy should take into account the availability of instruments such as diplomacy, information, the military, and economics. How these four instruments are intertwined to form a grand strategy and how each instrument contributes to national strategy is quite worth pursuing.

Final Remarks

What is the future of doctrinal choice? President Barak Obama announced recently during his nine day Asia-Pacific trip that “As we end today's wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and missions in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not-I repeat, will not-come at the expense of the Asia Pacific.”¹⁹⁰

Will COIN as a doctrinal choice survive? This declaration seemed to imply that COIN may again cede its position to a conventional warfare doctrine that focuses on China and India as emerging powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Responding to such a shift in the national level strategy, Gen. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined a military strategy to incorporate what the president directed. He suggested six continuities and five discontinuities that the military leadership should take into account.¹⁹¹ One of the six continuities that are expected to be persistent in

¹⁹⁰ Barak Obama, “US President Barak Obama’s Speech to Parliament,” The Australian National Affairs, November 17, 2011, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/obama-in-australia/obamas-speech-to-parliament/story-fnb0o39u-1226197973237> (accessed on January 14, 2012).

¹⁹¹ Dempsey pointed out American value of democracy, U.S. geography, Demography of diversity, Recourses competition, Violence extremism, and Professional military as continuity. As for discontinuities, he mentioned Arab Spring, Occupy Movement, Regime change in

the near future at least until the year of 2020 that attracts my attentions is violent extremism. Also Dempsey emphasized the existence of U.S. democratic values and competition for economic resources.

Despite this change of emphasis towards the Asia-Pacific region, the Chairman underlined that violent extremism would continue to exist. This implies that the military will continue to maintain the proper balance that encompasses a conventional and non-conventional doctrine. He hinted that “The idea that shifting strategic priority to the Pacific is probably profound enough for now. Now it is up to us who deliver the strategy, to deliver what that means...the military abandoned the two wars construct, which does not mean that the U.S. military will fight one war at a time. The nation does not need a military that can only do one thing at a time but needs a military that can do multiple tasks at the same time.”¹⁹²

The execution of simultaneous multiple tasks is made possible as result of the lessons learned from what the U.S. military has experienced over the last ten years, for example, the necessity of irregular operations, such as COIN and counterterrorism which emphasize the use of special operations forces. Defense secretary, Leon Panetta reportedly mentioned that “[I] would preserve financing for Special Operations forces, cyber-warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and the budget makes good on that promise.”¹⁹³ Based on an analysis of the comments made by both the civilian and military leadership regarding future military endeavors, after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the Army and Marine Corps will shrink to a level that is

North Korea, Information Technology, and non-biological intelligent. Dempsey, “Military Strategy in the 21st Century.”

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Defense Budget Cuts Would Limit Raises and Close Bases,” New York Times, January 26, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/us/pentagon-proposes-limiting-raises-and-closing-bases-to-cut-budget.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed on February 4, 2012).

slightly larger than the one in existence before the war on terror, while Special Operations forces, Intelligence, and the Navy will maintain their current level. No reduction is equivalent to an increase when we consider the huge cuts planned over the next ten years. Special Operation forces and intelligence based operations are regarded as necessary to prepare for COIN warfare, while a large Navy and reductions in the Army and Marine Corps have future implications for conventional warfare.

Based on the interaction between the civilian leadership and the military leadership, the US military doctrine for the near future is not expected to be abruptly changed, even though the strategic priority for the civilian leadership is moving toward a conventional approach. The military leadership still thinks that there is a need to create a balance between conventional warfare and COIN because the violent extremists are expected to be a persistent problem, and therefore; the military leadership must be flexible enough to maintain both a COIN and conventional doctrine.

Appendix I: The Military Leadership

1. US Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (August 19 1949- ...)
Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (February 6 1987- ...)
Chief of Staff of the US Army (August 15 1903 - ...)
Vice-Chief of Staff of the US Army (September 18 1947 - ...)
Chief of Naval Operations (May 11 1915 - ...)
Vice-Chief of Naval Operations (March 26 1942 - ...)
Chief of Staff of the US Air Force (September 26 1947 - ...)
Vice-Chief of Staff of the US Air Force (September 26 1947 - ...)

2. Unified Combatant Commands

Current

United States Africa Command (October 1 2007 - ...)
United States Central Command (January 1 1983 - ...)
United States European Command (March 15 1947 - ...)
United States Northern Command (October 1 2002 - ...)
United States Pacific Command (January 1 1947 - ...)
United States Southern Command (June 6 1963 - ...)
United States Special Operations Command (April 16 1987 - ...)
United States Strategic Command (June 1 1992 - ...)
United States Transportation Command (July 1 1987 - ...)

Inactivated

Atlantic Command (December 1 1947 – September 31 1999)
United States Joint Forces Command (October 1 1999 – September 3 2011)
US Strike Command (January 1 1962 – December 31 1971)
US Readiness Command (January 1 1972 – April 15 1987)
US Space Command (September 23 1985 – October 1 2002)

Appendix II: Codebook of the Military Leadership

1. Year: from 1948 to 2011 (Whoever in position in Feb. each will be under the year)

2. Position (18)

- a. CJCS (Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff)
- b. VJCS(Vice Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff)
- c. ACOS(Army Chief of Staff)
- d. VACS(Vice Army Chief of Staff)
- e. NCNO(Navy Chief of Operations)
- f. VNCN(Navy Vice Chief of Operations)
- g. ARCF(Air force Chief of Staff)
- h. VARS(Air force Vice Chief of Staff)
- i. PACOM (Pacific Command)
- j. EUCOM(European Command)
- k. CECOM(Central Command)
- l. SOCOM (Southern Command)
- m. NOCOM(Northern Command)
- n. AFCOM(Africa Command)
- o. STCOM(Strategic Command)
- p. SOCOM(Special Operations Command)
- q. TRCOM(Transportation Command)
- r. JFCOM (Joint Forces Command)

3. Name

4. Service

- a. 1: Army
- b. 2: Navy
- c. 3: Air Force
- d. 4: Marine Corps

5. Type of Commission

- a. 0: Military Academy Graduate (US Military Academy (West Point), Naval Academy (Annapolis), Air Force Academy)
- b. 1: Others (ROTC, OCS and so on)

6. Civilian Education (MA)

- a. 0: None

- b. 1: MA
- 7. Area of MA Degree:** For example Political Science, Computer Science and so on
- 8. MA Degree Dummy**
 - a. 0: other areas
 - b. 1: social science
- 9. MA University:** For example, University of Chicago , Binghamton university and so on
- 10. Civilian Education Ph.D**
 - a. 0: None
 - b. 1: Ph.D
- 11. Area of Ph. D Degree:** The name of major
- 12. Ph. D Area Dummy**
 - a. 0: other areas
 - b. 1: Social science
- 13. Ph. D. University:** The name of the University that one gets degree
- 14. Civilian Education MA above**
 - a. 0: Neither MA nor Ph.d
 - b. 1: Ph.d or MA
- 15. Experience of Working in other area**
 - a. 0: None
 - b. 1: State Department
 - c. 2: CIA or other information related agency
 - d. 3: others
- 16. Experience of working in other area dummy**
 - a. 0: None
 - b. 1: either of 1-3 above

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